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Abstract 
Nonpublic clients make up a substantial portion of audit firm client portfolios and the demands 
they place on the audit firm differ from those of public clients. As such, I investigate the 
influence of nonpublic audit concentration (NPAC) on the quality, timeliness, and cost 
effectiveness of public client audits. I find that NPAC is unrelated to audit quality and negatively 
related to the likelihood of late filing financial statements and audit fees for public clients. My 
study contributes to audit literature that investigates the effect of audit firm portfolio 
characteristics on audit outcomes by 1) providing a new measure that allows researchers to proxy 
for nonpublic audit influence and 2) investigating the potential impact of NPAC on public client 
audit outcomes. My findings are important because they suggest that timely and cost-effective 
audits of similar quality are available from providers that do not concentrate on public client 
audits. 
  
  
Acknowledgements 
 
I would like to thank my dissertation committee Cory Cassell (chair), Gary Peters, Stephen 
Rowe, and Jonathan Shipman for their helpful comments and guidance. I would also like to 
acknowledge Accounting Today for generously providing the top 100 accounting firm-level data 
used in this paper.   
  
  
Dedication 
I dedicate my dissertation to my husband, Joshua Hunt, who not only encouraged me to take this 
path, but decided to walk down it with me and received his PhD in Accounting alongside me. I 
am also grateful for the love and support of my parents, Jerry and Theresa Jimmerson, who 
taught me the value of hard work and discipline from an early age and gave me the courage to 
chase my dreams.  
  
Table of Contents 
 
Introduction ................................................................................................................................1 
 
Prior Literature and Hypotheses Development ..........................................................................7 
 
Sample Selection and Research Methodology .........................................................................13 
 -Sample Selection ........................................................................................................13 
 -Research Methodology ...............................................................................................17 
 
Results ......................................................................................................................................22 
 -Descriptive Statistics ..................................................................................................22 
 -Correlation Table ........................................................................................................23 
 -Main Analyses ............................................................................................................24 
 -Additional Analyses and Robustness Tests ................................................................26 
 
Conclusion ...............................................................................................................................42 
References ................................................................................................................................45 
Appendix ..................................................................................................................................49 
 
 
  
 
1 
1. Introduction 
 
 Several accounting papers study the influence of audit firm portfolio characteristics and 
composition on audit outcomes. For example, seminal papers by Dopuch and Simunic (1980) 
and DeAngelo (1981) find that audit quality is positively related to audit firm size. More recent 
work investigates the effects of other audit firm portfolio characteristics such as city-specific 
industry specialization (Ferguson, Francis, and Stokes 2003; Francis, Reichelt, and Wang 2005; 
Reichelt and Wang 2010), national industry specialization (Balsam, Krishnan, and Yang 2003; 
Krishnan 2003; Lim and Tan 2008; Dunn and Mayhew 2004), and busy season client 
concentration (Lopez and Peters 2012). While the accounting literature seeks to understand audit 
firm characteristics that affect the quality of public client audits, it has not investigated the 
potential impact of a large component of the client portfolio of most firms – the set of nonpublic 
audit clients.1 
Francis, Khurana, Martin, and Pereira (2011: 489) describe the sparse research related to 
the audits of nonpublic clients as follows: “Despite the importance of smaller entities to the 
economy and capital markets, surprisingly little is known about these firms with respect to their 
accounting and auditing choices or the economic consequence of these choices.” Limitations in 
data availability have largely confined audit portfolio research to the study of public clients. 
While data limitations continue to pose significant problems for researchers attempting to 
directly answer the call in Francis et al. (2011), this study uses novel data to answer a related 
question – whether the concentration of nonpublic clients at the audit firm level influences audit 
outcomes for public audit clients.  
                                                 
1 The data used in this study allow for the disaggregation of total audit and assurance fees into those collected from 
public clients and those collected from nonpublic clients.  
  
 
2 
Nonpublic clients make up a substantial portion of the overall economy and, more 
important to this study, audit firm portfolios. Private companies represent more than 99 percent 
of all companies in the U.S. (Minnis 2011). Governmental and non-profit (GNP) organizations 
also make up a significant portion of audit firm portfolios. According to the U.S. Census 
Bureau’s 2012 “Census of Governments”, there are over 90,000 local governments including 
local counties, independent school districts, townships, municipalities, and special districts. State 
and local governments have more than 16 million full-time equivalent employees as of the 2006 
Census and report more than $1.8 trillion in general revenues as of the 2003 Census.2 There are 
currently 2.3 million non-profit organizations in the U.S. that include libraries, museums, 
religious organizations, private colleges and universities, fraternal and social organizations, 
professional and trade organizations, health care organizations, and many other community 
service-oriented organizations.3 In 2009, non-profit organizations reported $1.4 trillion in 
revenue (Wells 2012).   
Audit fees collected from nonpublic clients make up a significant portion of audit firm 
revenue. In 2014, for example, Deloitte collected approximately 60 percent of their audit fees 
from nonpublic clients while other Big 4 members collected between 40 and 60 percent of their 
audit fees from nonpublic clients. Midtier and small firms, on average, collected over 80 percent 
of their audit fees from nonpublic clients in 2014.4 More importantly, nonpublic client audits 
(and other services) are performed according to regulatory frameworks that differ significantly 
from that of public client audits. According to SAS No. 131, audit firms are required to conduct 
public client audits in accordance with Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) 
                                                 
2 The United States Census Bureau’s Census of Federal, State, & Local Governments, http://www.census.gov/govs 
3 The National Center for Charitable Statistics, http://nccs.urban.org/statistics/quickfacts.cfm. 
4 See Figure 1. 
  
 
3 
standards. The PCAOB requires public clients to submit audited financial statements prepared in 
accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) annually and reviewed 
financial statements quarterly to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which also 
requires annual integrated audits of public clients who are accelerated filers.  
While audits of private clients are to be conducted in accordance with Generally 
Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) and should also be prepared following GAAP, there is no 
requirement that they submit audited or reviewed financial statements to the SEC, nor is there a 
requirement for an integrated audit.5 Furthermore, nonpublic clients are allowed to depart from 
GAAP when the cost to comply becomes unreasonable. The American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants (AICPA) provides guidance in the Financial Reporting Framework for Small 
and Medium-Sized Entities to assist in determining whether GAAP compliance is necessary. 
With regard to the audits of GNP organizations, audits of organizations that receive 
federal awards greater than $750,000 require a Circular A-133 audit, also known as a single 
audit, which requires audit firms to follow Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards 
(GAGAS). Furthermore, many auditors of GNPs voluntarily follow GAGAS even when it is not 
required. Audits performed in accordance with GAGAS also require engagement team members 
working on GNP audits to obtain at least 24 hours of Yellow Book training in governmental 
auditing, the government environment, or the environment in which the GNP operates. 
Private and GNP companies often have non-busy season year ends that can be set 
according to their own criteria. Nonprofit companies usually choose a fiscal year end based on 
some or all of the following criteria: 1) The fiscal year should coincide with its program year so 
                                                 
5 A private company must file quarterly financial statements with the SEC if it has more than 500 shareholders and 
assets greater than or equal to $10 million in accordance with the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. This enables 
the SEC to monitor private companies that have a large number of shareholders and behave similarly to a public 
company.  
  
 
4 
that program activities do not fall into two different years, 2) The fiscal year end will ideally 
align with the terms of the organization’s major grants and/or funders, which simplifies the grant 
process, 3) Nonprofits that must be audited should not have a fiscal year end that falls during the 
organization’s busiest time of year which would prevent staff from being able to gather audit 
evidence to aid the audit, and 4) Nonprofits should consider their debt covenants and the cyclical 
nature of the organization’s operations and the impact that the fiscal year end will have on the 
calculation of those covenants. While these criteria lead many nonprofits to have fiscal year ends 
of June 30, nonprofit organizations may choose the fiscal year end as long as the end date is 
specified in the organizational documents. 6,7 Nonpublic entities also include governmental 
entities. All states in the U.S. have a fiscal year end of June 30 except Texas (August 31), New 
York (March 31), and Alabama and Michigan (September 30). Assuming that governmental 
entities generally follow the state’s fiscal year end, we can assume that most of these entities 
have non-busy season year ends.8 This is important because Lopez and Peters (2012) find that 
audit firms with a lower concentration of clients with similar fiscal year end dates are associated 
with better audit outcomes due to less workload compression. 
Audit firms also face lower litigation risk with nonpublic clients compared to public 
clients. Audit firms are incentivized to shift audit resources to areas of greater litigation risk 
(Simunic and Stein, 1996). Thus, audit firms with higher nonpublic audit concentration (NPAC) 
may be better equipped to shift resources to public clients which are relatively higher risk than 
                                                 
6 “Considerations for choosing your not-for-profit organizations fiscal year-end.” BKD CPA’s & Advisors Industry 
Insights, December, 2016. Nikki Kubly.  
7 “Nonprofits: Choosing or changing the fiscal year-end.” Langdon & Company CPAs, November 8, 2016. Lee 
Byrd. 
8 Daniel Gartland, a CPA and risk control consultant at CNA, states, “Many government and not-for-profit 
organizations require an audit. And since the fiscal year end of many of these organizations is something other than 
December 31, this type of service presents an opportunity for CPA firms to shift work outside of the traditional busy 
season.” See “Risks of not-for-profit and government audits.” Journal of Accountancy, April 1, 2016. 
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nonpublic clients, compared to audit firms with lower NPAC. Thus, audit firms with greater 
NPAC may have more flexibility in the due dates for audit opinions, suggesting that audit firms 
with greater NPAC have greater resource flexibility with regard to filing deadlines. 
Based on the preceding discussion, NPAC could have two divergent effects on public 
audit outcomes. First, audit firms with higher NPAC may enjoy greater resource flexibility as 
they complete the audits of their public clients. Because many nonpublic entities have non-busy 
season fiscal year ends, audit firms who have higher concentrations of non-busy season clients 
may experience smoother resource allocation throughout the year, leading to greater resource 
flexibility for their public clients. This, in turn, could lead to better public client audit outcomes 
for audit firms with higher NPAC.  
Alternatively, public clients of audit firms with greater NPAC could experience negative 
audit outcomes due to the audit firm’s relative inexperience with public client regulatory 
requirements. There is a wealth of accounting research that associates industry specialist audit 
firms with better audit outcomes, attributing the increase in quality to the audit firm’s deep 
industry knowledge (Reichelt and Wang 2010; Krishnan 2003; Balsam, Krishnan, and Yang 
2003; Dunn and Mayhew 2004, among others). Similarly, more public-concentrated audit firms 
should have more experience and deeper knowledge about public client audits. Thus, public 
clients of audit firms with greater NPAC could experience relatively worse audit outcomes.  
To investigate whether the benefits of resource flexibility related to greater NPAC 
outweigh the disadvantages of relative inexperience with public client audits, I use data from the 
Accounting Today “Top 100 Firms” report. The Accounting Today report provides a list of the 
top 100 accounting firms in the U.S. ranked by total revenue, broken into audit and assurance 
services, tax, management advisory services, and other services. I calculate audit and assurance 
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service fees collected from nonpublic clients by subtracting audit fees from public clients 
(calculated by summing audit fees in Audit Analytics by audit firm year) from total audit and 
assurance services revenue (provided by Accounting Today) by audit firm year. I then divide 
nonpublic audit fees by total audit and assurance services revenue to generate the percentage of 
audit fees collected from nonpublic clients for an audit firm year, i.e., NPAC. I use this measure 
to proxy for the potential influence that nonpublic audit clients have on the audit outcomes of 
public clients.  
Using misstatements to proxy for audit quality, I find that NPAC is not significantly 
associated with audit quality. Using financial statement late filing as a proxy for audit timeliness, 
NPAC is negatively and significantly associated with financial statement late filing. I find that a 
one standard deviation change in NPAC is associated with a 6.19 percent decrease in the 
unconditional probability of late filing. Collectively, these results suggest better audit outcomes 
for public audit clients that engage audit firms with higher NPAC. That is, although audit quality 
of public clients does not vary with NPAC, public clients of audit firms with higher NPAC are 
less likely to file late. Thus, the results suggest that the benefit of NPAC (resource flexibility) 
outweighs the potential cost (inexperience). 
In my final main analysis, I examine the association between NPAC and audit fees for 
public client audits.  If greater NPAC improves resource flexibility, then audit fees for public 
clients of audit firms with higher NPAC should be lower. Consistent with this, I find that NPAC 
is negatively and significantly associated with audit fees for public clients. This result, along 
with the results from the previous tests of audit quality and timeliness, suggests that NPAC is 
associated with more cost-effective audits for public clients. 
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My study contributes to the literature investigating audit firm portfolio characteristics 
such as industry expertise (Solomon, Shields, and Whittington 1999), workload compression 
(Lopez and Peters 2012), and audit firm size (Dopuch and Simunic 1980; DeAngelo 1981), 
among others. My findings should be of interest to audit committees and investors since they 
suggest that timely and cost-effective audits of similar quality are available from providers that 
do not have a high concentration of public client audits. My findings should also be of interest to 
researchers who seek to understand audit firm characteristics that impact public client audits. 
Whether NPAC influences the audit outcomes of public clients is an important empirical 
question to researchers because most audit portfolio-related literature excludes nonpublic clients 
from their study. By limiting analyses to characteristics of the portfolio of public clients, prior 
studies provide a useful but incomplete understanding of audit firm characteristics that affect 
audit outcomes. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: I discuss prior literature and the 
hypotheses development in section two, sample selection and research methodology in section 
three, results in section four, and my concluding remarks in section five. 
 
2. Prior Literature and Hypotheses Development  
 An extensive body of literature documents a number of audit firm characteristics 
(including portfolio composition) that impact public client audit outcomes. Examples include 
investigations of the effects of audit firm size (Dopuch and Simunic 1980; DeAngelo 1981; Dye 
1993), auditor industry expertise (Solomon et al. 1999; Krishnan 2003; Krishnan 2005; Balsam, 
Krishnan, and Yang 2003; Reichelt and Wang 2010), the concentration of clients during busy 
season (Lopez and Peters 2010; Lopez and Peters 2012), and the concentration of non-audit 
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service fees (Lisic, Myers, Pawlewicz, and Seidel 2017; Beardsley, Lassila, and Omer 2016), 
among others. Although the effects of audit firm portfolio characteristics and composition have 
been studied extensively, prior literature has largely ignored the potential impact of NPAC on the 
audit outcomes of public clients.  
Nonpublic clients make up a significant portion of audit firm client portfolios. In my 
sample, 47% of all audit fees are collected from nonpublic clients, with Big 4 audit firms 
collecting around 42% of their audit fees from nonpublic clients and non-Big 4 audit firms 
collecting around 70% of their audit fees from nonpublic clients. More importantly, nonpublic 
audit services are inherently different from public audits in terms of the nature of services 
provided, the level of assurance provided, and, within an audit, the regulatory requirements with 
which the audit firm must comply.  
The private client’s choice to engage an audit firm is a voluntary economic decision, not 
a regulatory mandate (Katz 2009). In choosing to engage an audit firm, private clients may 
choose to issue compiled or reviewed, rather than audited, financial statements, while public 
clients are required to have audited financial statements. A private client’s choice of engagement 
may depend heavily on the requirements of lenders. While some lenders require annual audited 
financial statements, many will accept reviewed, compiled, or even internally prepared financial 
statements depending on the relationship with the client and the magnitude of the loan. 
Svanström and Sundgren (2012) show that small private clients frequently use the incumbent 
audit firm for different types of non-audit services, while public clients in the post-SOX era are 
prohibited from receiving most non-audit services from their audit firm.  
Also included in my measure of NPAC is services provided to GNP organizations. GNP 
client’s monitoring incentives, performance goals, and operations differ from that of public 
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clients (Hardiman, Squires, and Smith 1987; Wilson, Kattelus, and Reck 2007; Vermeer 2008). 
In a GASB white paper, the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) note that 
governmental organizations do not operate in a competitive marketplace, have virtually no threat 
of liquidation, and do not have equity owners.9 The primary goal of most GNPs is to use their 
resources to support programs while publicly-traded companies focus on maximizing 
stockholders’ wealth (Lopez and Peters 2010). The Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) notes the following distinguishing characteristics of GNPs that set them apart from for-
profit business: 
1)Receipts of significant amounts of resources from resource providers who do not 
expect to receive repayment or economic benefits proportionate to the resources 
provided. 
2)Operating purposes that are other than to provide goods or services at a profit or profit 
equivalent. 
3)Absence of defined ownership interests that can be sold, transferred, or redeemed or 
that convey entitlement to a share of a residual distribution of resources in the event of 
liquidation of the organization.10 
Not only do nonpublic clients’ demands differ from those of public clients, but the audit 
firm’s responsibilities differ for nonpublic and public client audits. According to SAS No. 131, 
audit firms are required to conduct public client audits in accordance with PCAOB standards, 
while audits of nonpublic clients are to be conducted in accordance with GAAS and GNP audits 
in accordance with GAGAS.  The PCAOB requires public clients to submit audited financial 
                                                 
9 Governmental Accounting Standards Board, White Paper “Why Governmental Accounting and Financial 
Reporting is – and Should Be – Different.” (Norwalk, CT, 2013, revised), Executive Summary, p. ii. 
10 The Financial Accounting Standards Board, Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No.4 “Objectives of 
Financial Reporting by Nonbusiness Organizations.” (December 1980), p.6. 
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statements prepared in accordance with GAAP annually and reviewed financial statements 
quarterly to the SEC. Though private client financial statements should also be prepared 
following GAAP, there is no requirement that they submit audited financial statements to the 
SEC. Furthermore, private clients are allowed to depart from GAAP when the cost to comply 
becomes unreasonable. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) 
provides guidance in the Financial Reporting Framework for Small and Medium-Sized Entities 
to assist in determining whether GAAP compliance is necessary. Many public client audits 
require an integrated audit, while no such requirement exists for private client audits. In terms of 
requirements by lenders to private companies, many note the importance of internal controls but 
generally do not require compliance with SOX unless the company is preparing to be sold or 
make an initial public offering (Sinnett and Graziano 2006). According to the PCAOB’s 
Auditing Standard No. 5, an integrated audit requires the auditor to perform an audit of 
management’s assessment of the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting that is 
integrated with the audit of the financial statements. Performing the audit of internal controls 
requires the auditor to understand, test, and express an opinion on internal control over financial 
reporting.  For private clients, the auditor is not required to test internal controls and will likely 
only chose to do so if there are significant time savings related to reduced substantive testing for 
the financial statement audit.  
GNP organizations that receive greater than $750,000 in federal funding require a single 
audit, and other GNP organizations often require audits performed in accordance with GAGAS 
due to individual state mandates. Another contrast between public and nonpublic GNP audits is 
the litigation risk for the audit firm. Gordon, Greenlee, and Nitterhouse (1999) find that the 
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audits of public clients expose the audit firm to higher levels of market discipline and thus higher 
levels of litigation risk compared to GNP audits.  
Given the large proportion of audit fees that are collected from nonpublic clients and the 
significant differences in the needs of and regulations imposed on nonpublic and public clients, I 
expect that NPAC could influence public client audit outcomes. I offer two competing 
predictions. On one hand, it is possible that NPAC could positively impact resource flexibility 
when auditing public clients. Greater resource flexibility allows audit firms to shift audit 
resources to areas of greater litigation risk (Simunic and Stein, 1996), in this case, public clients. 
Thus, audit firms with higher NPAC may be better equipped to shift resources to public clients 
compared to audit firms with lower NPAC. As discussed above, relative to nonpublic audit 
clients, public audit clients and their audit firms face more stringent regulations and more severe 
consequences if the regulations are not followed. For example, SEC regulations require that 
public companies file annual reports containing audited financial statements 60 days (large 
accelerated filers), 75 days (accelerated filers), and 90 days (non-accelerated filers) after fiscal 
year end. Consistent with these deadlines causing resource allocation issues, Lopez and Peters 
(2012) find that audit firms with a lower concentration of companies with similar fiscal year end 
dates are associated with better audit outcomes due to less workload compression. As discussed 
previously, nonpublic clients often have non-busy season fiscal year ends, which could alleviate 
workload compression more for audit firms with higher NPAC. While private companies do not 
face filing deadlines with the SEC, they are often required to adhere to debt covenants which 
require audited, reviewed, compiled, or even self-prepared financial statements (depending on 
credit exposure, the size of the client, and the client’s relationship with the lender) 150 days 
following year end (Sinnett and Graziano 2006). However, these deadlines are often not aligned 
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with busy season deadlines imposed by the SEC, as private companies often have non-busy 
season fiscal year ends. Collectively, prior research suggests that audit firms with higher NPAC 
may enjoy more resource flexibility when auditing public clients, which could lead to better 
audit outcomes for public client audits. 
 On the other hand, public client audit outcomes may be worse for audit firms with higher 
NPAC due to the audit firm’s relative inexperience with public client regulatory requirements. 
Langli and Svanstrom (2014) show that nonpublic firms differ from public firms across a number 
of dimensions including regulation, agency costs, market exposure, litigation, and information 
environment. An audit firm with greater experience auditing nonpublic clients may lack 
expertise and deep knowledge in auditing public clients, which may lead to a negative 
association between NPAC and audit outcomes. Consistent with this argument, prior work finds 
that industry specialist audit firms provide better audit quality due, in part, to their deep industry 
knowledge (Reichelt and Wang 2010). Balsam et al. (2003) find that, controlling for audit firm 
size, clients of specialist audit firms are associated with better audit outcomes. Similarly, more 
public-concentrated audit firms should have more experience and deeper knowledge about public 
client audits. Thus, it is possible that audit firms with more experience and deeper knowledge 
about public clients will provide better audit outcomes in terms of audit quality and timeliness 
for public clients. These competing potential outcomes lead to the following hypotheses (stated 
in null form): 
H1: Audit quality for public clients is unrelated to NPAC. 
H2: Audit timeliness for public clients is unrelated to NPAC. 
 
 If greater NPAC leads to greater resource flexibility, then NPAC could be negatively 
associated with audit fees as auditors take advantage of efficiencies afforded by a more balanced 
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workload throughout the year. Gist (1994) find indirect evidence that links audit efficiency to 
lower audit fees. Dopuch, Gupta, Simunic and Stein (2003) study audit effort and pricing and 
note that efficient audit production could lead to fee discounting. However, as previously 
mentioned, the benefits of resource flexibility associated with NPAC could be outweighed by the 
cost of the auditor’s relative inexperience with public client regulatory requirements. Johnstone, 
Li, and Luo (2014) find a positive relation between the auditor’s inexperience and knowledge 
deficit of client processes and audit fees. The audit firm’s inexperience associated with high 
NPAC could lead to audit inefficiencies, which could be reflected in an audit fee premium. 
These competing potential outcomes lead to the following hypotheses (stated in null form): 
H3: Audit fees for public clients are unrelated to NPAC. 
 
3. Sample Selection and Research Methodology 
3.1 Sample Selection  
  My variable of interest, NPAC, is calculated using data provided by Accounting Today, a 
monthly trade magazine that focuses on tax and accounting news. The “Top 100 Firms” report 
uses self-reported U.S. revenue from U.S. accounting firms that include a breakdown of revenue 
from audit and assurance, tax, and management advisory services. Prior literature in accounting 
uses data provided by Accounting Today’s “Top 100 Firms” report. Most recently, Lisic et al. 
(2017) use the “Top 100 Firms” data to study the effect of consulting revenue on audit quality in 
the pre- and post-SOX periods. Chung and Kallapur (2003) also use the “Top 100 Firms” data to 
examine client importance and its effect on the relation between nonaudit fees and audit quality. 
I calculate nonpublic audit fees by subtracting public audit fees (audit fees by firm year in 
Audit Analytics) from the total audit revenue for a firm year as reported in the Accounting Today 
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“Top 100 Firms” report. I then divide nonpublic audit fees by total audit revenue to capture 
NPAC.  
Figure 1 depicts NPAC over time for each Big 4 firm and the cumulative NPAC over 
time for midtier and lowtier audit firm groups. I observe a drop in NPAC for EY from around 
63% in 2009 to 35.6% in 2010. This drop is due to large declines in audit revenue from both 
public and private firms. When I break NPAC into changes in the numerator (nonpublic audit 
fees) and denominator (total audit fees), I find that there is $2.411 billion decline in audit fees 
collected from nonpublic clients and a $2.474 billion decline in total audit fees collected in the 
U.S. by EY from 2009 to 2010. These declines are consistent with reports from the 2010 Big 
Four Firms Performance Analysis which notes that in 2010, EY was the only Big 4 firm whose 
revenue shrank while simultaneously increasing their Transaction Advisory Services by 9.4% 
and Advisory by 13.3%.11 To ensure that results are not driven by the decline in NPAC for EY in 
2010, I remove all observations from the year 2010 from the sample. I rerun the main analysis on 
this sample and the results from the main analyses hold. 
To validate the revenue in the “Top 100 Firms” report, I compare the revenue reported by 
Big 4 firms in Accounting Today’s “Top 100 Firms” report based on revenue reported by the Big 
4 firms on their respective websites. I focus on Big 4 firms because approximately 75 percent of 
the observations in my sample are audited by these firms. I match net revenue to that reported on 
the websites of Deloitte, EY, and KPMG for 2014 and 2015. PWC’s website reports total 
revenue for North America and the Caribbean combined. Thus, I compare the net revenue from 
Accounting Today’s “Top 100 Firms” report to the combined number reported on PWC’s 
website and find the revenue reported to be reasonable. I randomly select midtier firms and 
                                                 
11 “The 2010 Big Four Firms Performance Analysis.” www.big4.com 
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check their revenue reported in Accounting Today against their respective websites. For example, 
BDO reports revenue of $1.29 billion in 2017 to Accounting Today. In an article published on 
BDO’s website, the accounting firm reports revenue of $1.29 billion, an exact match.12 BKD 
reports revenue of $537.6 million in 2017 to Accounting Today. In their 2017 firm profile, they 
report revenue for domestic and international operations of $564 million the fiscal year ended 
May 2017.13 I attribute the difference in these numbers to the portion of revenue earned outside 
the U.S. since Accounting Today reflects revenue earned within the U.S. I also contacted the 
Editor-In-Chief of Accounting Today, who confirmed that the revenue reported is total revenue 
from both public and nonpublic clients within the U.S. While the revenue is self-reported, 
Accounting Today checks for reasonableness based on accounting firm growth as well as the 
revenue reported in prior years. I spoke to a representative at Accounting Today who said that the 
retention rate on reporting accounting firms is approximately 95% from year to year. This 
ensures that audit firms that are absent from the list in some years and return in subsequent years 
are absent because they did not make the “Top 100 Firms” cut, not because they did not report 
their revenue. This means that Accounting Today is able to check the reasonableness of the 
revenue reported based on accounting firm growth that is reported faithfully every year, lending 
additional credibility to the reasonableness of the revenue reported by Accounting Today’s “Top 
100 Firms.” 
I use a sample of client-year observations from 2005 through 2015 with necessary data in 
Compustat, Audit Analytics, and Accounting Today’s “Top 100 Firms” report. I match firm-level 
data from Accounting Today’s “Top 100 Firms” report to client-level data in Compustat and 
Audit Analytics by first hand-collecting “auditor fkeys” for all observations in the “Top 100 
                                                 
12 “BDO USA, LLP grows revenue by 9.6 percent in fiscal 2017.” https://www.bdo.com/news  
13 The 2017 BKD CPAs & Advisors Firm Profile is available at https://www.bkd.com/docs 
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Firms” report. The year assigned to these observations is the year that the report is issued by 
Accounting Today. Because accounting firms have different fiscal year ends and audit firms have 
clients with different fiscal year ends, there is no perfect way to match Accounting Today’s “Top 
100 Firms” data to client-level data. Therefore, I merge the datasets on “auditor fkey” and fiscal 
year from Audit Analytics and year of the “Top 100 Firms” report. To ensure that the results in 
this paper are not dependent on the choice to match Accounting Today “Top 100 Firms” reported 
firm-year to Audit Analytics fiscal year, I perform a separate analysis where I change the year 
reported in the “Top 100 Firms” report to the previous year if the accounting firm’s fiscal year 
end is between January 1 and June 30 and results remain unchanged. This is likely because 
accounting firm revenue, while increasing over the sample period, is relatively stable from year 
to year.  
I investigate the coverage of audit firms in my sample relative to the population in Audit 
Analytics for the years 2005 through 2015. There are 137 distinct firms that appear on 
Accounting Today’s “Top 100 Firms” report during the sample period. Of these firms, 37 do not 
audit companies that appear in Audit Analytics during the sample period. There are 874 audit 
firms in Audit Analytics during the sample period. Thus, in terms of audit firms, the Accounting 
Today’s “Top 100 Firms” report covers only 11.4 percent of Audit Analytics. However, many of 
these audit firms cover a large portion of the company years as well as audit fees collected that 
are reported in Audit Analytics. Therefore, I further investigate the coverage of company years in 
my sample relative to the population in Audit Analytics for the sample period 2005 through 
2015. I find that audit firms on Accounting Today’s “Top 100 Firms” report cover approximately 
59.4% of the company years in Audit Analytics and about 84.8% of the audit fees in Audit 
Analytics. Overall, the results of this investigation provide comfort that limiting the sample to 
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companies audited by firms appearing on the Accounting Today’s “Top 100 Firms” report should 
not limit the generalizability of the results. 
I restrict the sample to U.S.-based clients with a U.S.-based audit firm. I exclude clients 
with standard industry classification (SIC) codes between 4400 and 4999 and between 6000 and 
6999 because they face different regulatory and reporting requirements.14 My final sample 
consists of 21,777 firm-year observations. 
3.2 Research Methodology 
 
3.2.1 Test of Audit Quality (H1) 
 
My first hypothesis tests the implications of NPAC on public client audit quality. I proxy 
for audit quality using misstatements as revealed through Form 8-K financial statement 
restatements (MISSTATE). Misstatements are frequently used as a proxy for audit and financial 
reporting quality (Liu, Raghunandan, and Rama 2009; Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, and 
Subramanyam 1998; Francis, Maydew, and Sparks 1999; Kinney, Palmrose, and Scholz 2004) 
and represent a verifiable occurrence of poor audit quality (DeFond 2010). Using a linear 
probability model (LPM) design to test H1, I regress misstatements on NPAC and other controls 
as follows15: 
MISSTATEit = 0 + 1NPACit + 2CLIENTSIZEit + 3LEVERAGEit + 4GCOit + 5LOSSit + 
6ROAit + 7TENUREit + 8INFLUENCEit + 9INTANGIBLESit + 10BUSYit + 
11ACCEL_FILERit + 12MTBit + 13FINit + 14FREECit + 15ACQit+16ARINVit 
+ 17ICMWit + 18MKT_VOLit +19AUDITORSIZEit + 20AFEE_CLIENTit 
+21TAX_CLIENTit + jIndustry FEit +kYear FEit +  ε (1) 
 
where: 
 
                                                 
14 SIC codes 4400 through 4999 include utility, communication, and transportation service industries. SIC codes 
6000 through 6999 include finance, insurance, and real estate industries. 
15 I follow Shipman, Swanquist, and Whited (2017) in using a linear probability model to estimate equation (1) 
because it allows me to interpret the coefficient on NPAC. Statistical inferences are similar when I use a logistic 
regression model. 
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MISSTATE = Indicator variable equal to one if the client has a financial 
statement misstatement reported through the filing of a Form 8-K 
with the SEC, zero otherwise; 
 
NPAC  = Audit fees collected from nonpublic clients divided by total audit 
fees collected as reported by Accounting Today’s “Top 100 firms” 
report; 
 
CLIENTSIZE  = The natural logarithm of total assets;  
 
LEVERAGE  = Total liabilities divided by total assets;  
 
GCO  = Indicator variable equal to one if the client is issued a going 
concern opinion in the year, zero otherwise; 
 
LOSS  = Indicator variable equal to one if net income is less than zero, 
zero otherwise; 
  
ROA  = Operating income after depreciation divided by total assets; 
 
TENURE  = Indicator variable equal to one if the current audit firm’s tenure 
is more than four years, zero otherwise; 
 
INFLUENCE  = Client audit fees divided by audit firm’s total fees;  
 
INTANGIBLES  = Intangible assets divided by total assets; 
 
BUSY = Indicator variable equal to one if the client has a December 31st 
fiscal year end, zero otherwise; 
 
ACCEL_FILER = Indicator variable equal to one if the client is an accelerated filer, 
zero otherwise; 
 
MTB = Book value of equity divided by market value of equity; 
 
FIN = The sum of cash raised from the issuance of long-term debt, 
common stock, and preferred stock divided by total assets; 
 
FREEC = Cash from operations minus average capital expenditures; 
 
ACQ = Indicator variable equal to one if there is an acquisition, zero 
otherwise; 
 
ARINV = The sum of accounts receivable and inventory divided by total 
assets; 
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ICMW = Indicator variable equal to one if a material weakness in internal 
controls over financial reporting is disclosed in the year, zero 
otherwise; 
 
MKT_VOL = The standard deviation of the monthly price appreciation plus 
reinvestment of monthly dividends and cash equivalent 
distributions; 
 
AUDITORSIZE = Total revenue collected by the accounting firm in the year as 
reported by Accounting Today’s “Top 100 firms” report; 
 
AFEE_CLIENT = Audit fees at the client level. 
 
TAX_CLIENT = Tax fees paid to the auditor at the client level. 
 
Model (1) includes controls for client- and firm-level characteristics known to be 
associated with misstatements, following the model in Lisic et al. (2017). I add other control 
variables that may be correlated with the dependent variable including GCO, INFLUENCE, 
INTANGIBLES, BUSY, ACCEL_FILER, and AUDITORSIZE. My primary variable of interest is 
NPAC. In Model (1), 1 is the effect of NPAC on the audit quality of public clients. An 
insignificant coefficient on 1 would indicate that audit quality does not vary significantly with 
the level of NPAC. A positive (negative) and significant coefficient on 1 would indicate that 
audit quality is lower (higher) for public clients that engage audit firms with higher NPAC, 
suggesting that the disadvantage of inexperience with the regulatory requirements of public 
client audits is greater than (less than) the benefit of resource flexibility.  
3.2.2 Test of Audit Timeliness (H2) 
My second hypothesis tests the implications of NPAC on public client audit timeliness. I 
proxy for audit timeliness using late filings (LATE_FILE). Filing financial statements late is 
consequential for public clients for several reasons. For example, the SEC can punish public 
companies that file financial statements late by suspending their trading privileges or revoking 
their registration. In addition, Bartov and Konchitki (2017) find negative short and long run 
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market reactions to late filings and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) find that late filings negatively 
impact investors’ ability to make informed investment decisions, thus increasing information 
asymmetry and trading costs. Finally, Whittred (1980) associates the timeliness of financial 
reports with an increase in time taken to complete the year-end audit and the time spent in 
auditor-client negotiations. Using an LPM design to test H2, I regress the likelihood of filing 
financial reports late on NPAC and other controls as follows: 
LATE_FILEit =β0 + β1NPACit+ β2CLIENTSIZEit + β3LEVERAGEit + β4GCOit + β5LOSSit + 
β6ROAit + β7TENUREit + β8INFLUENCEit + β9INTANGIBLESit + β10BUSYit + 
β11ACCEL_FILERit + β12MTBit + β13FINit + β14FREECit + β15ACQit + β16ARINVit 
+ β17ICMWit + β18MKT_VOLit + β19AUDITORSIZEit + β20AFEE_CLIENTit + 
β21TAX_CLIENTit + β jIndustry FEit + β kYear FEit + µ  (2) 
 
where: 
 
LATE_FILE = Indicator variable equal to one if the client files a financial report 
late, zero otherwise; and 
 
all other variables are as previously defined. 
 My primary variable of interest is NPAC. In this regression, β1 is the effect of NPAC on 
the timeliness of public client filings with the SEC. An insignificant coefficient on β1 would 
indicate that audit timeliness does not vary significantly with the level of NPAC. A positive 
(negative) and significant coefficient on β1 would indicate that audit timeliness is worse (better) 
for public clients that engage audit firms with higher NPAC, suggesting that the disadvantage of 
inexperience with public client audits is greater than (less than) the benefit of resource flexibility.  
3.2.3 Test of Audit Pricing (H3) 
My third hypothesis tests the implications of NPAC on public client audit pricing. I proxy 
for audit pricing using audit fees (CLIENT_LNAFEE). Audit pricing is an important audit 
outcome that has been used as a proxy for both audit risk and auditor effort. Using an OLS 
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design to test whether audit fees vary with NPAC, I regress audit fees on NPAC and other 
controls as follows: 
CLIENT_LNAFEE =0 + 1NPACit+ 2CLIENTSIZEit + 3LEVERAGEit + 4GCOit + 
5LOSSit + 6ROAit + 7TENUREit + 8INFLUENCEit + 9INTANGIBLESit 
+ 10BUSYit + 11ACCEL_FILERit + 12MTBit + 13FINit + 14FREECit + 
15ACQit + 16ARINVit + 17ICMWit + 18MKT_VOLit + 
19AUDITORSIZEit + 20TAX_CLIENTit + jIndustry FEit + kYear FEit +  
  (3) 
 
where: 
 
CLIENT_LNAFEE = The natural logarithm of audit fees; and 
 
 
all other variables are as previously defined. 
My primary variable of interest is NPAC. In this regression, 1 is the effect of NPAC on 
audit fees for public clients. An insignificant coefficient would indicate that audit fees do not 
vary significantly with the level of NPAC. A positive (negative) and significant coefficient on 1 
would indicate that audit fees are higher (lower) for public clients that engage audit firms with 
higher NPAC. If NPAC is associated with resource flexibility through a more balanced 
workload, then I should observe a negative relation between NPAC and audit fees. However, if 
the benefits of resource flexibility associated with NPAC are outweighed by the cost of the audit 
firm’s relative inexperience with public client regulatory requirements, then I should observe an 
audit fee premium due to the inefficiencies associated with the audit firm’s inexperience and 
knowledge deficit of client processes and audit fees. 
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4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 I present descriptive statistics for the full sample in Table 1. Approximately 3.4 percent 
of the sample have a Form 8-K misstatement, which is consistent with prior literature that 
observes material misstatements. On average, 10.7 percent of the sample file their financial 
statements late. The average logged audit fees from public clients 13.75.  
Summary statistics for control variables are also consistent with expectations. I find that 
just over 4 percent of the company years in the sample are issued a going concern opinion. 
Approximately 35 percent of the company years in the sample reports a loss on their annual 
financial statements and approximately 71 percent have a December 31st fiscal year end. Just 
over 14 percent of the sample report an internal control material weakness. Average net revenue 
for accounting firms in my sample is approximately $5.8 billion, while average client level audit 
fees are just under $2 million and average client level auditor-provided tax fees are 
approximately $0.25 million.  
There is a concern that limiting this sample to companies audited by Accounting Today’s 
Top 100 audit firms may bias the sample. To address this concern, I compare the descriptive 
statistics from my sample to samples of public companies from prior literature. I find that my 
descriptive statistics are generally consistent with prior literature, providing some assurance that 
the sample is representative of the population of public companies. I also check the distributions 
of control variables against Lisic et al (2017), a recent paper that uses Accounting Today’s Top 
100 audit firm data. I find that MISSTATE is lower which is expected given that I use only 
material restatements. Also consistent with prior literature is the rate of late filing, client size, 
rate of going concern opinions issued, individual client influence, intangibles, rate of busy season 
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clients, rate of mergers and acquisitions, and level of accounts receivable. Compared to Lisic et 
al. (2017), the clients in my sample tend to be slightly more highly leveraged, are more likely to 
be accelerated filers, have slightly higher market-to-book ratios, greater cash raised from debt 
and equity, and are more likely to have internal control material weaknesses. 
(Insert Table 1 Here) 
I present descriptive statistics for Big 4 and non-Big 4 samples in Table 6. Prior literature 
generally finds significant differences in audit outcomes for clients of Big 4 versus non-Big 4 
audit firms (DeFond and Zhang 2014).16 Consistent with this notion, I find variation in my 
variables of interest as well as control variables across Big 4 and non-Big 4 samples. Clients of 
Big 4 auditors are less likely to file their financial statements late and tend to pay more in audit 
fees than clients of non-Big 4 auditors. Big 4 auditors collect a smaller portion of their fees from 
nonpublic clients than do non-Big 4 auditors. In a further examination of the Big 4 and non-Big 4 
samples in Figure 1, I find significant variation in NPAC across both Big 4 and non-Big 4 firms 
over time. The remaining descriptive statistics for control variables show that clients of Big 4 
auditors tend to be bigger and are less likely to receive a going concern opinion, report a loss on 
their annual financial statement, and are less likely to report an internal control material 
weakness. 
 (Insert Table 2 here) 
4.2 Correlation Table 
 I present Pearson and Spearman correlations in Table 3. NPAC is negatively associated 
with the likelihood of misstatement, positively associated with the likelihood of late-filing 
financial statements, and negatively associated with audit fees. NPAC is positively associated 
                                                 
16 See Table 7 for the cross sectional tests of clients of Big 4 audit firms. 
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with the client receiving a going concern opinion, experiencing a net loss, being a more 
influential client to the audit firm, experiencing an internal control material weakness and having 
higher market volatility. NPAC is negatively associated with client size, client leverage, client 
ROA, auditor tenure, having busy season clients, having accelerated filer clients, client market-
to-book ratio, client cash from financing, client free cash flow, auditor size, and client level audit 
and tax fees. Overall, the results from this univariate analysis appear to associate NPAC with 
smaller, lower-performing clients.  
(Insert Table 3 here) 
4.3 Main Analyses 
4.3.1 Audit Quality (H1) 
Table 4 reports results for the estimation of Model (1) which I use to test H1.17 The 
coefficient on NPAC is positive and insignificant (1= 0.001, p>0.10). Thus, I fail to reject the 
null hypothesis (H1) that material financial misstatements for public clients are unrelated to 
NPAC. Although nonpublic client audits make up a substantial portion of audit portfolios and are 
considerably different than public client audits, my results are consistent with NPAC having no 
significant influence on public client audit quality. 
With respect to the control variables, I find a positive and significant association between 
MISSTATE and LEVERAGE, ICMW, and AUDITORSIZE and a negative and significant 
association between MISSTATE and GCO, TENURE, FREEC, and ACQ, which is consistent 
with general expectations following prior literature on misstatements. 
(Insert Table 4 here) 
                                                 
17 I check the variance inflation factors (VIFs) for all variables of interest in Table 4. All VIFs are less than 4, 
warranting no further investigation with regard to multicollinearity concerns. 
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4.3.2 Audit Timeliness (H2) 
 Table 5 reports results for the estimation of Model (2) which I use to test H2. The 
coefficient on NPAC is negative and significant (ß = -0.037, p<0.05). Thus, I reject the null 
hypothesis (H2) that late filing financial statements for public clients is unrelated to NPAC. The 
model is estimated using a Linear Probability Model (LPM), so coefficient estimates can be 
interpreted as the likelihood change for a one-unit change in each regressor. Economic 
significance is calculated by multiplying the coefficient estimate on LATE_FILE (-0.037) by the 
standard deviation of NPAC (0.179). Given that the average rate of late filing in my sample is 
approximately 10.7 percent, the average marginal effect of a one standard deviation change 
represents an economically significant decrease of 6.19 percent (0.00662 / 0.107) in the 
unconditional probability of late filing. My results are consistent with audit firms with greater 
NPAC enjoying greater resource flexibility for their public clients.  
 With respect to the control variables, I find a positive and significant association between 
LATE_FILE and LEVERAGE, GCO, LOSS, ROA, INFLUENCE, INTANGIBLES, ARINV, 
ICMW, and AFEE_CLIENT and a negative and significant association between LATE_FILE and 
CLIENTSIZE, TENURE, BUSY, FREEC, MKT_VOL, AUDITORSIZE, and TAX_CLIENT, which 
is generally consistent with prior literature. 
(Insert Table 5 here) 
4.3.3 Audit Fees (H3) 
Table 6 reports results for the estimation of Model (3) which I use to test H3. The 
coefficient on NPAC is negative and significant (δ = -0.536, p<0.01). Thus, I reject the null 
hypothesis (H3) that audit fees for public clients are unrelated to NPAC. This result is consistent 
with my resource flexibility argument. The coefficient estimate implies that a one standard 
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deviation increase in NPAC is associated with a 9.59 percent (-0.536 x 0.179) decrease in audit 
fees. 
With respect to the control variables, I find a positive and significant association between 
CLIENT_LNAFEE and CLIENTSIZE, LEVERAGE, GCO, LOSS, INFLUENCE, INTANGIBLES, 
BUSY, ACCEL_FILER, FIN, ACQ, ARINV, ICMW, MKT_VOL, AUDITORSIZE, TAX_CLIENT 
and a negative and significant association between CLIENT_LNAFEE and ROA and FREEC, 
which is generally consistent with prior literature. 
(Insert Table 6 here) 
4.3.4 Summary of Main Analyses 
The results from my main analyses suggest better audit outcomes for public audit clients 
that engage audit firms with higher NPAC. That is, although audit quality of public clients does 
not vary with NPAC, public clients of audit firms with higher NPAC are less likely to file late 
and have lower audit fees. All three tests combined suggest that greater NPAC is associated with 
more cost-effective audits for public clients. Thus, the results suggest that the benefit of NPAC 
(resource flexibility) outweighs the potential cost (inexperience). 
4.4 Additional Analyses and Robustness Tests 
4.4.1 Cross-Sectional Tests 
4.4.1.1 Clients of Big 4 Audit Firms 
There is a concern that the association that I observe in my main analysis between NPAC 
and audit quality, timeliness, and cost effectiveness may vary across Big 4 and non-Big 4 audit 
clients (i.e., that I may not observe this association in the sample of Big 4 clients due to a lack of 
variation in audit outcomes among this group and that my results are being driven by clients of 
smaller auditors). To ensure that my results are generalizable to public clients of both Big 4 and 
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non-Big 4 audit firms, I split the sample by Big 4 and non-Big 4 audit clients and re-estimate my 
tests of H1, H2, and H3. I report my results in Table 7. The results for Big 4 audit firms are 
presented in Column (1) and the results for non-Big 4 audit firms are presented in Column (2). 
The difference in the variable of interest, NPAC, is presented in Column 3.18 
 In Table 7 Panel A, I report results for the estimation of Model (1), my misstatements 
model, on Big 4 and non-Big 4 clients. In Column (1), the coefficient on NPAC is negative and 
significant ( = -0.038, p<0.10) for the sample of Big 4 audit clients. In Column (2), the 
coefficient on NPAC is negative and insignificant ( = -0.002, p>0.10) for the sample of non-Big 
4 audit clients. I compare NPAC across the regressions using a Z-statistic and find no significant 
difference in the effect of NPAC on MISSTATE for Big 4 and non-Big 4 clients. While results 
from Column (1) alone may suggest that greater NPAC is associated with better audit outcomes 
for Big 4 audit clients, the insignificant difference in the coefficients on NPAC across Big 4 and 
non-Big 4 clients reported in Column (3) suggests that the effect of NPAC does not differ across 
groups. These results are generally consistent with my main analysis of misstatements reported 
in Table 3 in that they suggest better (or no worse) audit outcomes for clients of audit firms with 
higher NPAC. 
 In Table 7 Panel B, I report results for the estimation of Model (2), my likelihood of late 
filing model, on Big 4 and non-Big 4 clients. In Column (1), the coefficient on NPAC is negative 
                                                 
18 For all cross-sectional tests, I test whether the coefficient on NPAC is significantly different across sub-samples. I 
use a standard z-statistic as used Chen, Sun, and Wu (2010), among many other papers, in calculating the following 
test of differences: 
 
𝑍 =  
(?̂?𝑁𝑃𝐴𝐶1−?̂?𝑁𝑃𝐴𝐶2)
√𝑠2(?̂?𝑁𝑃𝐴𝐶1)+𝑠2(?̂?𝑁𝑃𝐴𝐶2)
, 
 
where ?̂?𝑁𝑃𝐴𝐶1  and  ?̂?𝑁𝑃𝐴𝐶2  are coefficient estimates from the two subsamples and 𝑠
2( ) are the squared standard 
errors of the coefficients.  
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and significant (ß = -0.165, p<0.01) for the sample of Big 4 audit clients. In Column (2), the 
coefficient on NPAC is negative and significant (ß = -0.119, p<0.01) for the sample of non-Big 4 
audit clients. The results in column (1) and (2) mirror the results for the likelihood of late filing 
in my main analyses reported in Table 5. The insignificant z-stat in column (3) indicates no 
significant difference in the effect of NPAC on the likelihood of late filing for Big 4 and non-Big 
4 clients and confirms that the result is not driven by either the Big 4 or non-Big 4 clients. 
 In Table 7 Panel C, I report results for the estimation of Model (3), my audit fees model, 
on Big 4 and non-Big 4 clients. In Column (1), the coefficient on NPAC is negative and 
significant ( = -0.357, p<0.01) for the sample of Big 4 audit clients. In Column (2), the 
coefficient on NPAC is negative and significant ( = -0.669, p<0.01) for the sample of non-Big 4 
audit clients.. The significant z-stat in column (3) indicates that the negative association between 
NPAC and audit fees is larger for non-Big 4 clients.  
 Results from Table 7 show that clients of non-Big 4 auditors benefit incrementally more 
from having an auditor with greater NPAC in terms of audit pricing, while the impact of NPAC 
on audit quality and audit timeliness are no different across the groups. Overall, these results 
show that inferences from my main analyses are generalizable to clients of both Big 4 and non-
Big 4 auditors. 
(Insert Table 7 here) 
4.4.1.2 Clients in Litigious Industries 
 Gordon, Greenlee, and Nitterhouse (1999) find that the audits of public clients expose the 
audit firm to higher levels of market discipline and thus higher levels of litigation risk. Given the 
higher probability that public clients will be sued compared to their nonpublic counterpart, it is 
possible that these clients also require an audit firm with greater expertise in navigating the needs 
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of public clients in terms of litigation risk. In Table 8, I test whether the benefits of resource 
flexibility associated with higher NPAC is outweighed by the cost of audit firm inexperience 
with auditing public clients (i.e., clients with greater litigation risks) for clients in litigious 
industries. First, I separate clients in litigious industries from those in non-litigious industries. I 
follow Cassell, Myers, and Seidel (2015) who classify clients in SIC codes 2833-2836, 3570-
3577, 3600-3674, 5200-5961, and 7370 as litigious clients. I then regress MISSTATE, 
LATE_FILE, and CLIENT_LNAFEE on NPAC in Panels A, B, C respectively. 
In Table 8 Panel A, I report results for the estimation of Model (1), my misstatements 
model, on clients in litigious industries (Column 1) and clients in non-litigious industries 
(Column 2). In Column (1), the coefficient on NPAC is positive and significant ( = 0.032, 
p<0.10) for clients in litigious industries. In Column (2), the coefficient on NPAC is negative and 
insignificant (=-0.011, p>0.10) for clients in non-litigious industries. I compare NPAC across 
the regressions using a Z-statistic and find a significant difference in the coefficients on NPAC 
indicating that clients in litigious industries are more likely to report a misstatement as NPAC 
increases. This result is consistent with public clients in litigious industries receiving higher 
quality audits from audit firms with lower NPAC compared to clients in non-litigious industries.  
In Table 8 Panel B, I report results for the estimation of Model (2), my likelihood of late 
filing model, on clients in litigious industries (Column 1) and clients in non-litigious industries 
(Column 2). In Column (1), the coefficient on NPAC is negative and insignificant (β = -0.029, 
p>0.10) for clients in litigious industries. In Column (2), the coefficient on NPAC is negative and 
significant (β = -0.044, p<0.05) for clients in non-litigious industries. However, the z-stat in 
Column (3) is insignificant, which leads me to conclude that there is no significant difference in 
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the association between LATE_FILE and NPAC for clients in litigious industries and clients in 
non-litigious clients.  
 In Table 8 Panel C, I report results for the estimation of Model (3), my audit fees model, 
on clients in litigious industries (Column 1) and clients in non-litigious industries (Column 2). In 
Column (1), the coefficient on NPAC is negative and significant ( = -0.421, p<0.01) for clients 
in litigious industries. In Column (2), the coefficient on NPAC is negative and significant ( = -
0.585, p<0.01) for clients in non-litigious industries. The Z-statistic in Column (3) is significant, 
which is consistent with NPAC being more negatively associated with audit fees for clients in 
non-litigious industries.  
My results from Table 8 suggest that clients in litigious industries are more likely to 
misstate financial statements, are equally likely to file financial statements late, and experience a 
smaller decline in audit fees when engaging an audit firm with greater NPAC. Overall, my results 
are consistent with clients in litigious industries benefitting from auditor expertise in navigating 
the needs of public clients (i.e., lower NPAC) and show that inferences from my main analysis 
that demonstrate the benefit of resource flexibility associated with greater NPAC may be more 
generalizable to clients in non-litigious industries. 
(Insert Table 8 here) 
4.4.1.3 Busy Season Clients 
 In my primary tests, I find results consistent with NPAC providing greater resource 
flexibility for audit firms. If audit firms with greater NPAC experience greater resource 
flexibility for their public clients, then busy season clients, which make up over 71 percent of my 
sample and are arguably competing more for the auditor’s attention than non-busy season clients, 
may especially benefit from having an audit firm with greater NPAC due to their audit firm’s 
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more balanced portfolio of busy and non-busy season clients. In other words, the relative decline 
in audit quality associated with being a busy season client due to competition in audit resources 
could be mitigated by engaging an auditor with greater NPAC (i.e., greater resource flexibility). I 
test this in Table 9. 
In Table 9 Panel A, I report results for the estimation of Model (1), my misstatements 
model, on busy season clients in Column (1) and non-busy season clients in Column (2). In 
Column (1), the coefficient on NPAC is negative and insignificant (α = -0.007, p>0.10) for busy 
season clients. In Column (2), the coefficient on NPAC is negative and insignificant (α = -0.019, 
p>0.10) for non-busy season clients. In Column (3) I compare NPAC across the regressions 
using a Z-statistic and find no significant difference in the coefficients on NPAC across busy 
season and non-busy season clients.  
 In Table 9 Panel B, I report results for the estimation of Model (2), my likelihood of late 
filing model, on busy season clients in Column (1) and non-busy season clients in Column (2). In 
Column (1), the coefficient on NPAC is negative and significant (ß = -0.040, p<0.05) for busy 
season clients. In Column (2), the coefficient on NPAC is negative and significant (ß = -0.057, 
p<0.10) for non-busy season clients. In Column (3) I compare NPAC across the regressions 
using a Z-statistic and find no significant difference in the coefficients on NPAC across busy 
season and non-busy season clients.  
 In Table 9 Panel C, I report results for the estimation of Model (3), my audit fees model 
on busy season clients in Column (1) and non-busy season clients in Column (2). In Column (1), 
the coefficient on NPAC is negative and significant ( = -0.554, p<0.01) for busy season clients. 
In Column (2), the coefficient on NPAC is negative and significant ( = -0.490, p<0.01) for non-
busy season clients. In Column (3) I compare NPAC across the regressions using a Z-statistic and 
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find no significant difference in the coefficients on NPAC across busy season clients and non-
busy season clients. 
Overall my results do not show any differences in the effect of NPAC on audit quality, 
audit timeliness, and audit pricing across busy and non-busy season clients. While these results 
are not consistent with NPAC mitigating the negative association between busy season clients 
and audit quality, they do provide evidence that inferences from my main analyses that 
demonstrate the benefit of resource flexibility associated with greater NPAC are generalizable 
across both busy and non-busy season clients.  
(Insert Table 9 here) 
4.4.1.4 Clients of Audit Firms with Five or Fewer Audit Offices 
Audit firms with numerous offices likely have a higher level of resource flexibility to 
begin with versus audit firms with fewer audit offices due to the transferability of resources 
between offices. I suspect that audit firms with fewer audit offices (i.e. lower inherent resource 
flexibility) may especially benefit from resource flexibility associated with greater NPAC. I test 
this in Table 10. 
In Table 10 Panel A, I report results for the estimation of Model (1), my misstatements 
model, on clients of audit firms with five or fewer offices in Column (1) and clients of audit 
firms with greater than five offices in Column (2). In Column (1), the coefficient on NPAC is 
negative and insignificant (α = -0.043, p>0.10) for clients of audit firms with five or fewer 
offices. In Column (2), the coefficient on NPAC is positive and insignificant (α = 0.010, p>0.10) 
for clients of audit firms with greater than five offices. In Column (3) I compare NPAC across 
the regressions using a Z-statistic and find no significant difference in the coefficients on NPAC 
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across clients of audit firms with five or fewer offices and clients of audit firms with greater than 
five offices.  
 In Table 10 Panel B, I report results for the estimation of Model (2), my likelihood of late 
filing model, on clients of audit firms with five or fewer offices (Column 1) and clients of audit 
firms with greater than five offices (Column 2). In Column (1), the coefficient on NPAC is 
negative and insignificant (β = -0.055, p>0.10) for clients of audit firms with five or fewer 
offices. In Column (2), the coefficient on NPAC is negative and significant (ß = -0.038, p<0.05) 
for clients of audit firms with greater than five offices. In Column (3) I compare NPAC across 
the regressions using a Z-statistic and find no significant difference in the effect of NPAC on the 
likelihood of late filing for clients of audit firms with five or fewer offices and clients of audit 
firms with greater than five offices.   
In Table 10 Panel C, I report results for the estimation of Model (3), my audit fees model, 
on clients of audit firms with five or fewer offices in Column (1) and clients of audit firms with 
greater than five offices in Column (2). In Column (1), the coefficient on NPAC is negative and 
significant ( = -0.757, p<0.01) for clients of audit firms with five or fewer offices. In Column 
(2), the coefficient on NPAC is negative and significant ( = -0.508, p<0.01) for clients of audit 
firms with greater than five offices. In Column (3) I compare NPAC across the regressions using 
a Z-statistic and find a significant difference in the effect of NPAC on audit fees for clients of 
audit firms with five or fewer offices and clients of audit firms with greater than five offices. The 
results indicate NPAC is more negatively associated with audit fees for clients of audit firms 
with five or fewer audit offices. 
The results in Table 10 show that clients of audit firms with five or fewer offices benefit 
incrementally more from having an auditor with greater NPAC in terms of audit pricing, while 
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the impact of NPAC on audit quality and audit timeliness are no different across the groups. 
Overall, these results generally suggest that inferences from my main analyses are generalizable 
across these groups. 
 (Insert Table 10 here) 
4.4.1.5 Clients of High Growth Audit firms 
If NPAC is associated with greater resource flexibility, then audit firms may especially 
benefit from higher NPAC during periods of high growth. Bills, Swanquist, and Whited (2015) 
find that significant recent growth temporarily stresses office resources leading to worse audit 
quality. Thus, it is possible that relatively higher levels of NPAC could mitigate this effect. I test 
this by splitting the sample into high growth and low growth audit firms. I measure growth at the 
firm level as audit fees collected in year t minus audit fees collected in year t-1 divided by audit 
fees collected in year t-1. Audit firms whose growth is greater than the median growth for that 
year are classified as High Growth and audit firms whose growth is less than the median growth 
for that year are classified as Low Growth.  
In Table 11 Panel A, I report results for the estimation of Model (1), my misstatements 
model, on clients of High Growth audit firms in Column (1) and clients of Low Growth audit 
firms Column (2). In Column (1), the coefficient on NPAC is negative and insignificant (α = -
0.000, p>0.10) for clients of High Growth audit firms. In Column (2), the coefficient on NPAC is 
positive and insignificant (α = 0.014, p>0.10) for clients of Low Growth audit firms. In Column 
(3) I compare NPAC across the regressions using a Z-statistic and find no significant difference 
in the coefficients on NPAC across clients of High Growth audit firms and clients of Low Growth 
audit firms.  
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 In Table 11 Panel B, I report results for the estimation of Model (2), my likelihood of late 
filing model, on clients of High Growth audit firms in Column (1) and clients of Low Growth 
audit firms in Column (2). In Column (1), the coefficient on NPAC is negative and insignificant 
(β = -0.041, p>0.10) for clients of High Growth audit firms. In Column (2), the coefficient on 
NPAC is positive and insignificant (β = -0.032, p>0.10) for clients of Low Growth audit firms 
between NPAC and the likelihood of late filing for either group. In Column (3) I compare NPAC 
across the regressions using a Z-statistic and find a significant difference in the effect of NPAC 
on the likelihood of late filing for clients of High Growth audit firms.  
 In Table 11 Panel C, I estimate model (3), my audit fees model, on clients of High 
Growth audit firms in Column (1) and clients of Low Growth audit firms in Column (2). In 
Column (1), the coefficient on NPAC is negative and significant ( = -0.348, p<0.01) for clients 
of High Growth audit firms. In Column (2), the coefficient on NPAC is negative and significant 
( = -0.663, p<0.01) for clients of Low Growth audit firms. In Column (3) I compare NPAC 
across the regressions using a Z-statistic and find a significant difference in the effect of NPAC 
on audit fees for between NPAC and audit fees for clients of High Growth audit firms and clients 
of Low Growth audit firms where clients of High Growth audit firms are less negatively 
associated with audit fees.  
 Overall, the results in Table 11 show some evidence that NPAC mitigates the negative 
audit outcomes associated with high growth at the audit firm level with regard to the likelihood 
of late filing financial statements. These results provide evidence that inferences from my main 
analyses regarding audit quality and audit pricing are generalizable across clients of High 
Growth and Low Growth auditors. 
(Insert Table 11 here) 
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4.4.2 Other Additional Tests 
4.4.2.1 Audit firm Switching 
Results from my main tests show that the benefits of resource flexibility associated with 
NPAC outweigh the costs of relative inexperience in auditing public clients in terms of audit 
quality, timeliness, and pricing. Reason (2010) reports that in the post-Sarbanes Oxley era 
following a period of soaring audit fees and the practical disappearance of value-added services, 
companies are now demanding more value from their audit firm. One such example cited by 
Reason (2010) is IDT’s (a telecommunications provider) switch from Ernst & Young to Grant 
Thornton in early 2008 whose CFO cited audit value as the driving force behind the switch. 
Broadly, my main results provide evidence that audit firms with greater NPAC provide greater 
value to their public clients. If audit value drives client decisions to switch auditors, I suspect that 
clients of audit firms with higher (lower) NPAC will be less likely (more likely) to switch 
auditors. In the case of a switch, I suspect that clients will be likely to switch to an audit firm 
with greater NPAC. Using an LPM design to test whether the likelihood of switching auditors 
varies with NPAC, I regress AUDITOR_SWITCHt+1 on NPAC and other controls as follows: 
AUDITOR_SWITCHt+1 =Ω0 + Ω 1NPACit+ Ω2CLIENTSIZEit + Ω 3LEVERAGEit + Ω 
4GCOit + Ω5LOSSit + Ω6ROAit + Ω7TENUREit + Ω8INFLUENCEit+ 
Ω9INTANGIBLESit + Ω10BUSYit + Ω 11ACCEL_FILERit + 
Ω12MTBit + Ω 13FINit + Ω14FREECit + Ω15ACQit + Ω16ARINVit + 
Ω17ICMWit + Ω18MKT_VOLit + Ω 19AUDITORSIZEit + 
Ω20AFEE_CLIENTit + Ω21TAX_CLIENTit + Ω jIndustry FEit + 
ΩkYear FEit +  υ       (4) 
 
where: 
 
AUDITOR_SWITCHt+1 = Indicator variable equal to one if the client switches audit 
firms in year t+1, zero otherwise. 
 
all other variables are as previously defined. 
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 I report results of test of the association between NPAC and the likelihood of switching 
audit firms in t+1 in Table 12. I find a negative association (Ω = -0.050, p<0.01) between NPAC 
and AUDITOR_SWITCHt+1. This result shows that clients of audit firms with higher (lower) 
NPAC are less likely (more likely) to switch auditors.  
With respect to the control variables, I find a positive and significant association between 
AUDITOR_SWITCHt+1 and GCO, LOSS, ROA, INFLUENCE, ARINV, ICMW, and 
AUDITORSIZE and a negative and significant association between CLIENTSIZE, LEVERAGE, 
TENURE, and MKT_VOL, which is generally consistent with prior literature. 
In an untabulated test, I limit the sample to company years in which the client switches 
audit firms and find that the average NPAC in the year prior to the switch is 47.5 percent and the 
average NPAC in the year of the switch is 56.5 percent. This result shows that, on average, 
clients switch to audit firms with greater NPAC.  
Collectively, these results show that clients, presumably seeking the best audit value, are 
more likely to stay with an audit firm with greater NPAC, i.e., an audit firm that is providing 
similar audit quality in a more timely and cost effective manner, on average. Furthermore, clients 
that do switch audit firms are likely to choose an audit firm with greater NPAC. These results are 
important to my main analysis because they provide evidence that clients are aware of audit 
value that is associated with greater NPAC and impound this into their decision to switch away 
from or retain an auditor. 
(Insert Table 12 here) 
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4.4.3 Robustness Tests 
4.4.3.1 Discretionary Accruals as a Measure of Audit Quality 
In my primary test of H1, I examine the relation between audit quality and NPAC, where 
the proxy for audit quality is MISSTATE. However, DeFond and Zhang (2014) recommend that 
researchers use multiple proxies for audit quality to take advantage of each measure’s strengths 
and weaknesses. Thus, in this section, I consider an alternative proxy for audit quality – 
discretionary accruals. Balsam et al. (2003) and Krishnan (2005) use discretionary accruals to 
examine the audit quality consequences of audit firm specialization, which is similar in structure 
to my study of the audit quality consequences of NPAC. Using an OLS design to test whether 
audit quality (as measured by discretionary accruals) varies with NPAC, I regress discretionary 
accruals on NPAC and other controls as follows: 
ACCRUALS =0 + 1NPACit+ 2CLIENTSIZEit + 3LEVERAGEit + 4GCOit + 5LOSSit 
+ 6ROAit + 7TENUREit + 8INFLUENCEit + 9INTANGIBLESit + 
10BUSYit + 11ACCEL_FILERit + 12MTBit + 
  13FINit + 14FREECit + 15ACQit + 16ARINVit + 17ICMWit + 
18MKT_VOLit + 19AUDITORSIZEit + 20AFEE_CLIENTit + 
21TAX_CLIENTit + jIndustry FEit + kYear FEit +    (5) 
 
where: 
 
ACCRUALS = The absolute value of the residual from a modified performance 
adjusted discretionary accruals model as in Kothari et al. (2005); 
and 
 
all other variables are as previously defined. 
Table 13 reports results for the estimation of Model (5) which I use to test whether audit 
quality (as measured by discretionary accruals) varies with NPAC. Similar to model (1), 1 is the 
effect of NPAC on the audit quality for public clients. Consistent with my primary findings, the 
results indicate that the level of NPAC has no significant impact on audit quality ( = -0.002, 
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p>0.10). These results help to ensure that earlier results are not sensitive to my choice of audit 
quality proxy. 
With respect to the control variables, I find a positive and significant association between 
ACCRUALS and LEVERAGE, GCO, LOSS, BUSY, ACCEL_FILER, FIN, FREEC, ACQ, ICMW, 
and AUDITORSIZE and a negative and significant association between ACCRUALS and 
CLIENTSIZE, ROA, TENURE, and INTANGIBLES, which is generally consistent with prior 
literature. 
(Insert Table 13 here) 
4.4.3.2 Audit Opinion Delay as a Measure of Audit Timeliness 
 In my primary test of H2, I examine the relation between NPAC and audit timeliness, 
where LATE_FILE is the proxy for audit timeliness. In this section, I supplement my primary 
results by using audit opinion delay as an alternative proxy for audit timeliness. Bamber, 
Bamber, and Schoderbek (1993) use audit opinion delay as a proxy for audit inputs arguing that 
audit opinion delay provides insight into audit efficiency, one component of which is timeliness. 
Furthermore, Givoly and Palmon (1982) find that the length of the audit is the single most 
important determinant of the timeliness of the earnings announcement. Thus, audit opinion delay 
should capture audit timeliness. I regress audit opinion delay on NPAC and other controls in the 
following LPM regression: 
DELAY =0 + 1NPACit+ 2CLIENTSIZEit + 3LEVERAGEit + 4GCOit + 
5LOSSit + 6ROAit + 7TENUREit + 8INFLUENCEit + 
  9INTANGIBLESit +10BUSYit + 11ACCEL_FILERit + 12MTBit + 
  13FINit + 14FREECit + 15ACQit + 16ARINVit + 17ICMWit + 
18MKT_VOLit + 19AUDITORSIZEit + 20AFEE_CLIENTit + 
21TAX_CLIENTit + jIndustry FEit + kYear FEit +    (6) 
 
where: 
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DELAY = The number of days between the fiscal year end and the audit 
opinion date; and 
 
all other variables are as previously defined. 
Table 14 reports results for the estimation of Model (6) which I use to test whether audit 
timeliness (as measured by audit opinion delay) varies with NPAC. Consistent with model (2) 
above, 1 is the effect of NPAC on audit timeliness for public clients. The results again indicate 
that NPAC has a negative and significant impact on audit opinion delay quality ( = -1.916, 
p<0.05). This result helps to ensure that earlier results are not sensitive to my choice of audit 
timeliness proxy. 
With respect to the control variables, I find a positive and significant association between 
DELAY and LEVERAGE, GCO, LOSS, ROA, INFLUENCE, INTANGIBLES, ARINV, ICMW, 
MKT_VOL, AFEE_CLIENT and a negative and significant association between DELAY and 
CLIENTSIZE, TENURE, ACCEL_FILER, MTB, FIN, FREEC, ACQ, AUDITORSIZE, 
TAX_CLIENT, which is generally consistent with prior literature. 
(Insert Table 14 here) 
4.4.3.3 Alternative Measure of NPAC 
My measure of NPAC assumes that all fees in audit analytics are from public clients. 
There is a concern that some public clients in Audit Analytics may behave differently than 
normal public clients, which would affect the numerator in my variable of interest, NPAC. Thus, 
in robustness (Table 15), I recalculate NPAC excluding private firms with public debt from my 
calculation of the numerator in NPAC. I identify private firms with public debt that exists in my 
sample by following Badertscher, Jorgensen, Katz, and Kinney (2014). They identify private 
firms with public debt as compustat observations that meet the following criteria: (1) the firm’s 
stock price at fiscal year-end is unavailable (2) total debt as well as total annual revenues exceed 
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$1 million (3) the firm is a U.S.-domiciled company (4) the firm is not a subsidiary of another 
public firm (5) the firm is not a financial institution or in a regulated industry. I exclude these 
observations totaling 1,823 company years from the numerator in my variable of interest and 
find results consistent with my main tests with regard to audit quality and audit pricing. Contrary 
to my main results, I do not find that NPAC is associated with a decreased likelihood of late 
filing.  
(Insert Table 15 Here) 
4.4.3.4 Alternative Clustering by Company 
 Petersen (2009) suggests that residuals may be correlated across companies, which could 
bias OLS standard errors. Thus, to test the robustness of my main findings, I cluster observations 
by company for each of my main analyses and compare the results.  
 I report my findings in Table 16. After clustering by company for Models (1), (2), and 
(3), I find results similar to those reported in my main analyses. In Column (1), I regress 
MISSTATE on NPAC and other controls and find that the coefficient on NPAC is positive and 
insignificant (α = 0.001, p>0.10). In Column (2), I regress LATE_FILE on NPAC and other 
controls and find that the coefficient on NPAC is negative and significant (ß = -0.037, p<0.05). 
In Column (3), I regress CLIENT_LNAFEE on NPAC and other controls and find that the 
coefficient on NPAC is negative and significant (δ = -0.530, p<0.01). Control variables from all 
three regressions in Table 16 are similar to those in my main analyses. 
Overall, results from clustering by company suggest better audit outcomes for public 
audit clients that engage audit firms with higher NPAC, similar to my main analyses. That is, 
even when clustering by company, audit quality of public clients does not vary with NPAC, 
public clients of audit firms with higher NPAC are less likely to file late and are associated with 
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lower audit prices, suggesting that greater NPAC is associated with more cost-effective audits for 
public clients. Thus, the results provide additional support for the notion that the benefit of 
NPAC (resource flexibility) outweighs the potential cost (inexperience). 
(Insert Table 16 Here) 
 
5. Conclusion 
Nonpublic audit fees make up a substantial portion of audit fees collected by accounting 
firms. More importantly, nonpublic audits are inherently different from public audits in terms of 
the level of assurance provided (compilation, review, or audit) and, within an audit, the 
responsibility of the audit firm to comply with regulatory requirements. I argue that NPAC could 
have two divergent impacts on public client audit outcomes. First, audit firms with high NPAC 
may have greater resource flexibility when completing public client audits which could be 
associated with better public client audit outcomes. Second, public clients of audit firms with 
greater NPAC could experience negative audit outcomes due to the audit firm’s relative 
inexperience with the regulatory requirements of public client audits.  
Using audit firm-level data provided by Accounting Today’s “Top 100 Firms” report, I 
find no significant association between NPAC and public client audit quality. In addition, I find 
evidence that greater NPAC is associated with a lower likelihood of filing financial statements 
late and lower audit fees. Collectively, my results suggest that higher NPAC is associated with 
more timely and cost-effective audits for public clients.  
I perform a number of additional analyses and find that NPAC is associated with more 
timely and cost effective audits for clients of both Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors and that NPAC 
may be associated with worse audit quality and less cost effective audits among clients in 
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litigious industries. I also find that inferences about the association of NPAC with more timely 
and cost effective audits are unchanged regardless of whether the client is a busy season filer, the 
ability of the audit firm to shift resources based on the number of audit offices, or audit firm 
growth. Given that results point to NPAC being associated with better audit value overall, I test 
the whether clients seek audit value in their decision to switch audit firms and find that the 
likelihood of switching audit firms decreases as NPAC increases and that clients that do switch 
are likely to choose an audit firm with greater NPAC.  
In robustness tests, I find that my inferences are not sensitive to my choice of proxies for 
audit quality and audit timeliness.  In other robustness tests, I use an alternative measure of 
NPAC and perform an alternative clustering approach by company and find results that are 
generally consistent with main analyses of audit quality, audit timeliness, and audit fees. 
 My findings should be important to audit committees charged with engaging an audit 
firm because they suggest that timely and cost-effective audits of similar quality are available 
from providers that do not concentrate on public client audits. My findings also contribute to 
audit literature that investigates audit firm portfolio characteristics including industry expertise 
(Solomon et al. 1999), workload compression (Lopez and Peters 2012), and audit firm size 
(Dopuch and Simunic 1980; DeAngelo 1981), among others. In addition, my study answers a 
call for more research about small nonpublic companies and the consequences of their auditing 
choices from Francis et al. (2011). Finally, I also provide a new measure, NPAC, that allows 
researchers to proxy for the influence of nonpublic clients within the audit firm’s portfolio.  
 My study is subject to two important limitations. First, because the sample is limited to 
accounting firms appearing on the Accounting Today’s “Top 100 Firms” report, my results may 
not be generalizable to public clients audited by audit firms not appearing on the reports. 
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Because smaller audit firms tend to have smaller audit clients due to resource limitations for 
auditing larger clients, this could also systemically exclude smaller public clients from my 
sample. Second, my variable of interest, NPAC, includes all non-public audit fees collected by 
the audit firm. As such, I am unable disentangle audit and assurance fees collected from private, 
non-profit, governmental, and other clients. These limitations in my study provide an opportunity 
for future research as more and better data become available.  
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Appendix 
Variable Definitions 
 
MISSTATE = Indicator variable equal to one if the client has a financial statement 
misstatement reported through the filing of a Form 8-K with the SEC, zero 
otherwise. 
 
LATE_FILE = Indicator variable equal to one if the client files a financial report late, 
zero otherwise. 
 
CLIENT_LNAFEE = The natural logarithm of audit fees. 
 
NPAC  = Audit fees collected from nonpublic clients divided by total audit fees 
collected as reported by Accounting Today’s “Top 100 firms” report. 
 
CLIENTSIZE  = The natural logarithm of total assets.  
 
LEVERAGE  = Total liabilities divided by total assets.  
 
GCO  = Indicator variable equal to one if the client is issued a going concern 
opinion in the year, zero otherwise. 
 
LOSS  = Indicator variable equal to one if net income is less than zero, zero 
otherwise. 
  
ROA  = Operating income after depreciation divided by total assets. 
 
TENURE  = Indicator variable equal to one if the current audit firm’s tenure is more 
than four years, zero otherwise. 
 
INFLUENCE  = Client audit fees divided by audit firm’s total fees. 
 
INTANGIBLES  = Intangible assets divided by total assets. 
 
BUSY = Indicator variable equal to one if the client has a December 31st fiscal 
year end, zero otherwise. 
 
ACCEL_FILER = Indicator variable equal to one if the client is an accelerated filer, zero 
otherwise. 
 
MTB = Book value of equity divided by market value of equity. 
 
FIN = The sum of cash raised from the issuance of long-term debt, common 
stock, and preferred stock divided by total assets. 
 
FREEC = Cash from operations minus average capital expenditures. 
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ACQ = An indicator variable equal to one if there is an acquisition, zero 
otherwise. 
 
ARINV = The sum of accounts receivable and inventory divided by total assets. 
 
ICMW = An indicator variable equal to one if a material weakness in internal 
controls over financial reporting is disclosed in the year, zero otherwise. 
 
MKT_VOL = The standard deviation of the monthly price appreciation plus 
reinvestment of monthly dividends and cash equivalent distributions. 
 
AUDITORSIZE = Total revenue collected by the accounting firm in that year as reported 
by Accounting Today’s “Top 100 firms” report. 
 
AFEE_CLIENT = Audit fees at the client level. 
 
TAX_CLIENT = Tax fees paid to the auditor at the client level. 
 
ACCRUALS = The absolute value of the residual from a modified performance adjusted 
discretionary accruals model as in Kothari et al. (2005). 
 
DELAY  = The number of days between the fiscal year end and the audit opinion 
date. 
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Figure 1. NPAC over the sample period of each Big 4 audit firm and average NPAC over the 
sample period for Midtier and Lowtier audit firms. 
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics for Regression Variables 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Median S.D. 75th 25th 
MISSTATE 21,777 0.034 0 0.183 0 0 
LATE_FILE 21,777 0.107 0 0.309 0 0 
CLIENT_LNAFEE 21,777 13.753 13.752 1.179 14.498 12.221 
NPAC 21,777 0.474 0.425 0.179 0.576 0.356 
CLIENTSIZE 21,777 6.038 6.050 2.079 7.453 13.455 
LEVERAGE 21,777 0.507 0.471 0.313 0.644 0.291 
GCO 21,777 0.046 0 0.209 0 0 
LOSS 21,777 0.353 0 0.478 1 0 
ROA 21,777 -0.009 0.064 0.275 0.117 -0.017 
TENURE 21,777 0.533 1 0.499 1 0 
INFLUENCE 21,777 0.009 0.001 0.048 0.003 0.000 
INTANGIBLES 21,777 0.174 0.103 0.194 0.284 0.009 
BUSY 21,777 0.713 1 0.453 1 0 
ACCEL_FILER 21,777 0.859 1 0.449 1 1 
MTB 21,777 3.445 2.08 53.786 3.619 1.210 
FIN 21,777 0.200 0.04 1.092 0.219 0.006 
FREEC 21,777 51.122 8.349 196.897 33.617 1.029 
ACQ 21,777 0.001 0 0.035 0 0 
ARINV 21,777 0.257 0.227 0.188 0.366 0.109 
ICMW 21,777 0.143 0 0.350 0 0 
MKT_VOL 21,777 16.923 11.887 322.443 16.950 8.252 
AUDITORSIZE 21,777 5838.300 6330.64 3521.674 8034 4115 
AFEE_CLIENT 21,777 1.939 0.938 3.714 1.979 0.434 
TAX_CLIENT 21,777 0.254 0.040 0.735 0.189 0 
The sample consists of all observations that have the necessary data from Audit Analytics, 
Compustat, and Accounting Today’s “Top 100 firms” report. 
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Table 2 
Summary Statistics for Regression Variables 
Big 4 versus non-Big 4 
 
 Big 4 
Variable Obs. Mean Median S.D. 75th 25th 
MISSTATE 16,548 0.035 0 0.183 0 0 
LATE_FILE 16,548 0.082 0 0.274 0 0 
CLIENT_LNAFEE 16,548 14.111 14.027 1.008 14.732 13.425 
NPAC 16,548 0.405 0.406 0.108 0.492 0.344 
CLIENTSIZE 16,548 6.625 6.603 1.798 7.808 5.395 
LEVERAGE 16,548 0.506 0.487 0.277 0.646 0.310 
GCO 16,548 0.025 0 0.155 0 0 
LOSS 16,548 0.308 0 0.462 1 0 
ROA 16,548 0.021 0.074 0.229 0.123 0.010 
TENURE 16,548 0.644 1 0.479 1 0 
INFLUENCE 16,548 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.000 
INTANGIBLES 16,548 0.184 0.120 0.194 0.301 0.017 
BUSY 16,548 0.733 1 0.442 1 0 
ACCEL_FILER 16,548 0..903 1 0.295 1 1 
MTB 16,548 3.616 2.210 60.148 3.724 1.338 
FIN 16,548 0.184 0.043 1.198 0.209 0.008 
FREEC 16,548 65.448 14.455 223.445 47.420 3.122 
ACQ 16,548 0.001 0 0.035 0 0 
ARINV 16,548 0.245 0.219 0.175 0.343 0.108 
ICMW 16,548 0.102 0 0.302 0 0 
MKT_VOL 16,548 13.506 11.129 51.316 15.773 7.792 
AUDITORSIZE 16,548 7515.089 7463.770 2134.351 8232.1 5753 
AFEE_CLIENT 16,548 2.400 1.236 4.141 2.500 0.677 
TAX_CLIENT 16,548 0.325 0.071 0.829 0.281 0.004 
The sample consists of all observations that have the necessary data from Audit Analytics, 
Compustat and Accounting Today’s “Top 100 firms” report. 
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Table 2 (cont.) 
 
 Non-Big 4 
Variable Obs. Mean Median S.D. 75th 25th 
MISSTATE 5,229 0.034 0 0.182 0 0 
LATE_FILE 5,229 0.184 0 0.388 0 0 
CLIENT_LNAFEE 5,229 12.621 12.564 0.940 13.254 11.965 
NPAC 5,229 0.690 0.666 0.189 0.859 0.599 
CLIENTSIZE 5,229 4.181 4.239 1.796 5.342 3.132 
LEVERAGE 5,229 0.507 0.409 0.406 0.633 0.240 
GCO 5,229 0.113 0 0.317 0 0 
LOSS 5,229 0.495 0 0.500 1 0 
ROA 5,229 -0.104 0.018 0.370 0.088 -0.127 
TENURE 5,229 0.182 0 0.386 0 0 
INFLUENCE 5,229 0.033 0.007 0.093 0.025 0.002 
INTANGIBLES 5,229 0.142 0.053 0.189 0.225 0 
BUSY 5,229 0.648 1 0.478 1 0 
ACCEL_FILER 5,229 0.652 1 0.655 1 0 
MTB 5,229 2.905 1.639 24.467 3.147 0.883 
FIN 5,229 0.248 0.028 0.652 0.251 0.002 
FREEC 5,229 5.786 1.228 27.385 4.760 -0.349 
ACQ 5,229 0.001 0 0.037 0 0 
ARINV 5,229 0.295 0.263 0.218 0.445 0.112 
ICMW 5,229 0.272 0 0.445 1 0 
MKT_VOL 5,229 27.738 14.600 651.592 20.912 10.203 
AUDITORSIZE 5,229 531.818 558.000 419.980 939.550 98.580 
AFEE_CLIENT 5,229 0.481 .286 0.618 .570 .157 
TAX_CLIENT 5,229 0.029 0 0.076 0.030 0 
The sample consists of all observations that have the necessary data from Audit Analytics, 
Compustat and Accounting Today’s “Top 100 firms” report. 
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Table 3 
Pearson and Spearman Correlation Table 
Bold coefficients are significant at the <0.05 level. 
Pearson correlations are in the bottom left, Spearman correlations are in the top right. 
See the appendix for variable definitions. 
  
Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
MISSTATE (1)  0.100 0.001 -0.032 -0.023 0.016 -0.018 0.015 -0.024 -0.047 -0.007 0.014 
LATE_FILE (2) 0.100  -0.061 0.035 -0.165 0.076 0.203 0.159 -0.162 -0.165 0.112 -0.014 
CLIENT_LNAFEE (3) -0.001 -0.069  -0.338 0.848 0.266 -0.212 -0.274 0.331 0.332 0.234 0.367 
NPAC (4) -0.034 0.046 -0.419  -0.306 -0.026 0.125 0.123 -0.135 -0.229 0.426 -0.085 
CLIENTSIZE (5) -0.020 -0.176 0.860 -0.378  0.285 -0.266 -0.403 0.451 0.362 0.164 0.305 
LEVERAGE (6) 0.011 0.117 0.124 0.033 0.058  0.168 0.068 -0.014 0.032 0.181 0.106 
GCO (7) -0.018 0.203 -0.225 0.161 -0.327 0.314  0.269 -0.295 -0.139 0.072 -0.099 
LOSS (8) 0.015 0.159 -0.268 0.135 -0.402 0.140 0.269  -0.735 -0.175 -0.041 -0.167 
ROA (9) -0.001 -0.135 0.364 -0.172 0.525 -0.204 -0.508 -0.575  0.201 0.043 0.214 
TENURE (10) -0.047 -0.165 0.336 -0.258 0.360 -0.012 -0.139 -0.175 0.164  -0.142 0.092 
INFLUENCE (11) -0.004 0.053 -0.152 0.365 -0.141 0.008 0.062 0.033 -0.055 -0.108  0.162 
INTANGIBLES (12) 0.012 -0.004 0.264 -0.079 0.227 0.036 -0.058 -0.114 0.165 0.057 -0.024  
BUSY (13) -0.012 -0.042 0.067 -0.067 0.065 0.064 0.015 0.053 -0.062 0.034 -0.035 -0.006 
ACCEL_FILER (14) -0.003 -0.072 0.467 -0.220 0.318 -0.016 -0.102 -0.156 0.140 0.159 -0.099 0.087 
MTB (15) 0.000 -0.006 -0.008 -0.004 -0.017 -0.013 -0.005 0.004 -0.030 0.008 -0.004 -0.003 
FIN (16) 0.000 0.016 -0.046 0.016 -0.077 0.080 0.075 0.057 -0.151 -0.031 0.005 -0.017 
FREEC (17) -0.025 -0.067 0.393 -0.094 0.450 0.046 -0.058 -0.152 0.129 0.143 -0.016 0.010 
ACQ (18) -0.007 0.001 0.016 -0.005 0.011 -0.008 -0.002 -0.001 0.008 0.002 -0.003 0.006 
ARINV (19) 0.008 0.053 -0.007 0.100 -0.039 0.078 -0.038 -0.125 0.203 -0.056 0.065 -0.156 
ICMW (20) 0.100 0.341 -0.237 0.056 -0.310 0.069 0.154 0.157 -0.152 -0.229 0.069 -0.046 
MKT_VOL (21) -0.001 0.002 -0.026 0.021 -0.036 0.039 0.042 0.006 -0.004 -0.012 0.004 -0.011 
AUDITORSIZE (22) -0.026 -0.159 0.511 -0.460 0.484 0.015 -0.168 -0.154 0.186 0.389 -0.264 0.097 
AFEE_CLIENT (23) -0.010 -0.019 0.659 -0.165 0.552 0.137 -0.077 -0.146 0.152 0.184 -0.030 0.141 
TAX_CLIENT (24) -0.013 -0.049 0.461 -0.127 0.414 0.085 -0.062 -0.147 0.126 0.157 -0.029 0.140 
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Table 3 (Cont.) 
 
Bold coefficients are significant at the <0.05 level. 
Pearson correlations are in the bottom left, Spearman correlations are in the top right. 
See the appendix for variable definitions. 
  
Variable  (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) 
MISSTATE (1) -0.012 -0.003 0.002 0.018 -0.037 -0.007 0.007 0.100 0.025 -0.033 0.001 0.001 
LATE_FILE (2) -0.042 -0.081 -0.086 0.014 -0.167 0.001 0.042 0.341 0.123 -0.162 -0.061 -0.086 
CLIENT_LNAFEE (3) 0.054 0.464 0.099 0.079 0.683 0.015 0.062 -0.223 -0.335 0.474 1.000 0.529 
NPAC (4) -0.058 -0.182 -0.123 -0.060 -0.224 -0.004 0.062 0.038 0.176 -0.265 -0.337 -0.231 
CLIENTSIZE (5) 0.062 0.345 0.085 0.073 0.851 0.010 -0.006 -0.306 -0.442 0.450 0.848 0.497 
LEVERAGE (6) 0.073 0.019 -0.033 0.226 0.200 -0.005 0.108 0.020 0.036 0.087 0.266 0.141 
GCO (7) 0.015 -0.118 -0.112 0.074 -0.252 -0.002 -0.066 0.154 0.244 -0.157 -0.212 -0.138 
LOSS (8) 0.053 -0.171 -0.156 0.094 -0.526 -0.001 -0.159 0.157 0.415 -0.134 -0.274 -0.223 
ROA (9) -0.049 0.191 0.259 -0.084 0.614 0.002 0.205 -0.177 -0.413 0.166 0.331 0.255 
TENURE (10) 0.034 0.174 0.114 0.008 0.306 0.002 -0.033 -0.229 -0.203 0.360 0.332 0.263 
INFLUENCE (11) -0.046 -0.077 -0.070 -0.003 0.177 0.015 0.152 0.055 -0.055 -0.451 0.234 0.077 
INTANGIBLES (12) -0.030 0.127 0.041 0.057 0.251 0.013 0.004 -0.072 -0.214 0.121 0.367 0.233 
BUSY (13)  0.054 0.038 0.079 0.043 -0.004 -0.136 -0.071 0.050 0.068 0.054 0.001 
ACCEL_FILER (14) 0.053  0.121 0.044 0.282 0.003 -0.065 -0.148 -0.153 0.247 0.333 0.203 
MTB (15) 0.004 0.002  0.161 0.142 -0.005 -0.141 -0.044 -0.164 0.097 0.099 0.090 
FIN (16) 0.024 -0.018 0.499  0.016 -0.006 -0.142 0.053 0.048 0.051 0.079 0.004 
FREEC (17) 0.038 0.075 0.001 -0.020  0.010 -0.028 -0.268 -0.452 0.337 0.683 0.425 
ACQ (18) -0.004 0.002 -0.001 -0.002 0.001  0.003 -0.011 -0.008 -0.001 0.015 0.013 
ARINV (19) -0.128 -0.092 -0.023 -0.017 -0.068 0.001  0.048 -0.042 -0.067 0.062 0.064 
ICMW (20) -0.071 -0.132 -0.002 0.036 -0.090 -0.011 0.071  0.134 -0.232 -0.223 -0.133 
MKT_VOL (21) 0.006 -0.021 -0.001 0.028 -0.007 -0.001 0.002 0.005  -0.159 -0.335 -0.250 
AUDITORSIZE (22) 0.072 0.245 0.002 -0.022 0.124 -0.001 -0.098 -0.229 -0.018  0.474 0.323 
AFEE_CLIENT (23) 0.041 0.121 0.000 -0.027 0.634 0.013 0.016 -0.079 -0.009 0.207  0.529 
TAX_CLIENT (24) 0.038 0.092 0.001 -0.022 0.409 0.005 0.003 -0.087 -0.007 0.185 0.632  
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Table 4 
The association between audit quality (MISSTATE) and NPAC 
  
Coeff. t-value 
NPAC 0.001  (0.14) 
CLIENTSIZE 0.001  (0.85) 
LEVERAGE 0.012 ** (2.56) 
GCO -0.030 *** (-4.71) 
LOSS 0.005  (1.52) 
ROA -0.003  (-0.44) 
TENURE -0.010 *** (-3.37) 
INFLUENCE -0.010  (-0.57) 
INTANGIBLES 0.007  (0.94) 
BUSY -0.003  (-0.91) 
ACCEL_FILER 0.007  (1.62) 
MTB 0.000  (0.81) 
FIN -0.000  (-0.83) 
FREEC -0.000 *** (-3.29) 
ACQ -0.026 *** (-5.06) 
ARINV -0.005  (-0.56) 
ICMW 0.037 *** (6.58) 
MKT_VOL 0.000  (0.37) 
AUDITORSIZE 0.000 * (1.75) 
AFEE_CLIENT 0.000  (0.38) 
TAX_CLIENT -0.000  (-0.46) 
Constant      -0.015  (-0.96) 
Industry FE Yes   
Year FE   Yes  
 
Observations     21,777   
Adj. R-squared     0.027   
This table presents results from the estimation of Model (1) used to test H1. See the Appendix 
for variable definitions. Models are run with robust standard errors. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01 levels, respectively (using two-tailed tests).   
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Table 5 
The association between audit timeliness (LATE_FILE) and NPAC 
  
Coeff. t-value 
NPAC -0.037 ** (-2.27) 
CLIENTSIZE -0.003 * (-1.55) 
LEVERAGE 0.050 *** (5.64) 
GCO 0.191 *** (11.33) 
LOSS 0.056 *** (9.63) 
ROA 0.033 ** (2.35) 
TENURE -0.030 *** (-6.85) 
INFLUENCE 0.111 * (1.83) 
INTANGIBLES 0.048 *** (3.88) 
BUSY -0.012 *** (-2.61) 
ACCEL_FILER -0.001  (-0.30) 
MTB 0.000  (0.36) 
FIN -0.002  (-1.01) 
FREEC -0.000 *** (-6.52) 
ACQ 0.033  (0.66) 
ARINV 0.065 *** (3.96) 
ICMW 0.225 *** (23.57) 
MKT_VOL -0.000 *** (-7.13) 
AUDITORSIZE -0.000 *** (-3.46) 
AFEE_CLIENT 0.000 *** (7.17) 
TAX_CLIENT -0.000 *** (-3.17) 
Constant      0.004  (0.03) 
Industry FE Yes   
Year FE   Yes   
Observations     21,777   
Adj. R-squared     0.172   
This table presents results from the estimation of Model (2) used to test H2. See the Appendix 
for variable definitions. Models are run with robust standard errors. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01 levels, respectively (using two-tailed tests). 
  
 
59 
Table 6 
The association between audit fees (CLIENT_LNAFEE) and NPAC 
  
Coeff. t-value 
NPAC -0.536 *** (-19.37) 
CLIENTSIZE 0.484 *** (141.45) 
LEVERAGE 0.236 *** (16.84) 
GCO 0.058 *** (2.77) 
LOSS 0.120 *** (13.03) 
ROA -0.385 *** (-18.88) 
TENURE -0.010  (-1.35) 
INFLUENCE 0.232 ** (2.50) 
INTANGIBLES 0.161 *** (7.69) 
BUSY 0.045 *** (5.82) 
ACCEL_FILER 0.121 *** (10.77) 
MTB 0.000  (0.18) 
FIN 0.012 *** (5.37) 
FREEC -0.000 ** (-2.28) 
ACQ 0.183 ** (2.27) 
ARINV 0.541 *** (19.93) 
ICMW 0.063 *** (4.82) 
MKT_VOL 0.000 *** (4.98) 
AUDITORSIZE 0.000 *** (19.87) 
TAX_CLIENT 0.000 *** (18.53) 
Constant      10.146 *** (30.40) 
Industry FE Yes   
Year FE   Yes  
 
Observations     21,777   
Adj. R-squared     0.829   
This table presents results from the estimation of Model (3) used to test H3. See the Appendix 
for variable definitions. Models are run with robust standard errors. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01 levels, respectively (using two-tailed tests). 
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Table 7 
Additional Analyses: Cross sectional tests of clients of Big 4 audit firms 
 
Panel A: DV=MISSTATE  
 (1) (2) (3)  
Big 4 Non-Big 4 Difference  
Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value z-stat 
NPAC -0.038 * (-1.75) -0.002  (-0.08) -1.182  
Control Variables Yes   Yes     
Industry FE Yes   Yes     
Year FE   Yes   Yes     
Observations     16,548   5,229     
Adj. R-squared     0.032   0.027     
 
Panel B: DV=LATE_FILE  
 (1) (2) (3)  
Big 4 Non-Big 4 Difference  
Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value z-stat 
NPAC -0.165 *** (-5.48) -0.119 *** (-2.80) -0.875  
Control Variables Yes   Yes     
Industry FE Yes   Yes     
Year FE   Yes   Yes     
Observations     16,548   5,229     
Adj. R-squared     0.160   0.167     
 
Panel C: DV=CLIENT_LNAFEE  
 (1) (2) (3)  
Big 4 Non-Big 4 Difference  
Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value z-stat 
NPAC -0.357 *** (-7.59) -0.669 *** (-12.36) 6.113 *** 
Control Variables Yes   Yes     
Industry FE Yes   Yes     
Year FE   Yes   Yes     
Observations     6,432   15,345     
Adj. R-squared     0.823   0.841     
This table presents results from the estimation of Model (1), (2), and (3) used to test H1, H2, and 
H3 for clients of Big 4 and non-Big 4 audit firms. See the Appendix for variable definitions. The 
Z-statistic is calculated using the formula referenced in footnote 18. Models are run with robust 
standard errors. *, **, *** indicate significance at p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01 levels, 
respectively (using two-tailed tests).  
  
  
 
61 
Table 8 
Additional Analyses: Cross sectional tests of clients in litigious industries 
 
Panel A: DV=MISSTATE  
 (1) (2) (3)  
Litigious Non-Litigious Difference  
Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value z-stat 
NPAC 0.032 * (1.89) -0.011  (-0.92) 2.077 *** 
Control Variables Yes   Yes     
Industry FE Yes   Yes     
Year FE   Yes   Yes     
Observations     6,432   15,345     
Adj. R-squared     0.032   0.027     
 
Panel B: DV=LATE_FILE  
 (1) (2) (3)  
Litigious Non-Litigious Difference  
Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value z-stat 
NPAC -0.029  (-0.96) -0.044 ** (-2.25) 0.408  
Control Variables Yes   Yes     
Industry FE Yes   Yes     
Year FE   Yes   Yes     
Observations     6,432   15,345     
Adj. R-squared     0.145   0.191     
 
Panel C: DV=CLIENT_LNAFEE  
 (1) (2) (3)  
Litigious Non-Litigious Difference  
Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value z-stat 
NPAC -0.421 *** (-8.65) -0.585 *** (-17.56) 2.778 *** 
Control Variables Yes   Yes     
Industry FE Yes   Yes     
Year FE   Yes   Yes     
Observations     6,432   15,345     
Adj. R-squared     0.819   0.834     
This table presents results from the estimation of Model (1), (2), and (3) used to test H1, H2, and 
H3 for clients in litigious industries and clients in non-litigious industries. See the Appendix for 
variable definitions. The Z-statistic is calculated using the formula referenced in footnote 18. 
Models are run with robust standard errors. *, **, *** indicate significance at p < 0.10, p < 0.05, 
and p < 0.01 levels, respectively (using two-tailed tests).  
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Table 9 
Additional Analyses: Cross sectional tests of busy season clients 
 
Panel A: DV=MISSTATE  
 (1) (2) (3)  
Busy Non-Busy Difference  
Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value z-stat 
NPAC -0.007  (-0.65) 0.019  (0.99) -1.182  
Control Variables Yes   Yes     
Industry FE Yes   Yes     
Year FE   Yes   Yes     
Observations     15517   6260     
Adj. R-squared     0.026   0.046     
 
Panel B: DV=LATE_FILE  
 (1) (2) (3)  
Busy Non-Busy Difference  
Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value z-stat 
NPAC -0.040 ** (-2.07) -0.057 * (-1.76) 0.448  
Control Variables Yes   Yes     
Industry FE Yes   Yes     
Year FE   Yes   Yes     
Observations     15517   6260     
Adj. R-squared     0.171   0.183     
 
Panel C: DV=CLIENT_LNAFEE  
 (1) (2) (3)  
Busy Non-Busy Difference  
Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value z-stat 
NPAC -0.554 *** (-16.74) -0.490 *** (-9.89) -1.087  
Control Variables Yes   Yes     
Industry FE Yes   Yes     
Year FE   Yes   Yes     
Observations     15517   6260     
Adj. R-squared     0.828   0.839     
This table presents results from the estimation of Model (1), (2), and (3) used to test H1, H2, and 
H3 for busy and non-busy season clients. See the Appendix for variable definitions. The Z-
statistic is calculated using the formula referenced in footnote 18. Models are run with robust 
standard errors. *, **, *** indicate significance at p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01 levels, 
respectively (using two-tailed tests).  
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Table 10 
Additional Analyses: Cross sectional tests of clients of audit firms with five or fewer offices 
 
Panel A: DV=MISSTATE  
 (1) (2) (3)  
<=5 Offices >5 Offices Difference  
Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value z-stat 
NPAC -0.043  (-0.90) 0.010  (0.95) -1.077  
Control Variables Yes   Yes     
Industry FE Yes   Yes     
Year FE   Yes   Yes     
Observations     1046   20731     
Adj. R-squared     0.029   0.029     
 
Panel B: DV=LATE_FILE  
 (1) (2) (3)  
<=5 Offices >5 Offices Difference  
Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value z-stat 
NPAC -0.055  (-0.58) -0.038 ** (-2.32) -0.170  
Control Variables Yes   Yes     
Industry FE Yes   Yes     
Year FE   Yes   Yes     
Observations     1046   20731     
Adj. R-squared     0.196   0.159     
 
Panel C: DV=CLIENT_LNAFEE  
 (1) (2) (3)  
<=5 Offices >5 Offices Difference  
Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value z-stat 
NPAC -0.757 *** (-6.51) -0.508 *** (-17.87) -2.079 ** 
Control Variables Yes   Yes     
Industry FE Yes   Yes     
Year FE   Yes   Yes     
Observations     1046   20731     
Adj. R-squared     0.696   0.819     
This table presents results from the estimation of Model (1), (2), and (3) used to test H1, H2, and 
H3 for clients of audit firms with fewer than 5 offices and clients of audit firms with greater than 
5 offices. See the Appendix for variable definitions. The Z-statistic is calculated using the 
formula referenced in footnote 18. Models are run with robust standard errors. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01 levels, respectively (using two-tailed tests).  
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Table 11 
Additional Analyses: Cross sectional tests of clients of high growth audit firms  
 
Panel A: DV=MISSTATE  
 (1) (2) (3)  
High Growth Low Growth Difference  
Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value z-stat 
NPAC -0.000  (-0.03) 0.014  (1.06) -0.751  
Control Variables Yes   Yes     
Industry FE Yes   Yes     
Year FE   Yes   Yes     
Observations     8893   8974     
Adj. R-squared     0.018   0.015     
 
Panel B: DV=LATE_FILE  
 (1) (2) (3)  
High Growth Low Growth Difference  
Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value z-stat 
NPAC -0.041  (-1.53) 0.032  (1.25) -1.969 ** 
Control Variables Yes   Yes     
Industry FE Yes   Yes     
Year FE   Yes   Yes     
Observations     8893   8974     
Adj. R-squared     0.180   0.164     
 
Panel C: DV=CLIENT_LNAFEE  
 (1) (2) (3)  
High Growth Low Growth Difference  
Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value z-stat 
NPAC -0.348 *** (-7.47) -0.663 *** (-15.49) <0.01 *** 
Control Variables Yes   Yes     
Industry FE Yes   Yes     
Year FE   Yes   Yes     
Observations     8893   8974     
Adj. R-squared     0.837   0.838     
This table presents results from the estimation of Model (1), (2), and (3) used to test H1, H2, and 
H3 for clients of high growth audit firms and clients of low growth audit firms. See the Appendix 
for variable definitions. The Z-statistic is calculated using the formula referenced in footnote 18. 
Models are run with robust standard errors. *, **, *** indicate significance at p < 0.10, p < 0.05, 
and p < 0.01 levels, respectively (using two-tailed tests).  
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Table 12  
Additional Analysis: The association between the likelihood of switching audit firms and 
NPAC 
DV=AUDITOR_SWITCHt+1  
Coeff. t-value 
NPAC -0.050 *** (-5.08) 
CLIENTSIZE -0.002 * (-1.90) 
LEVERAGE -0.015 *** (-3.52) 
GCO 0.019 ** (2.05) 
LOSS 0.012 *** (3.58) 
ROA 0.019 *** (2.77) 
TENURE -0.073 *** (-24.47) 
INFLUENCE 0.123 *** (2.82) 
INTANGIBLES 0.001  (0.14) 
BUSY -0.003  (-1.00) 
ACCEL_FILER -0.003  (-0.70) 
MTB -0.000  (-0.16) 
FIN -0.000  (-0.06) 
FREEC 0.000  (0.23) 
ACQ 0.009  (0.25) 
ARINV 0.016 * (1.75) 
ICMW 0.019 *** (3.80) 
MKT_VOL -0.000 *** (-3.27) 
AUDITORSIZE 0.000 *** (7.49) 
AFEE_CLIENT 0.000  (1.51) 
TAX_CLIENT -0.000  (-0.93) 
Constant      0.020  (1.36) 
Industry FE Yes   
Year FE   Yes   
Observations     21777   
Adj. R-squared     0.048   
This table presents results from the estimation of Model (4). AUDITOR_SWITCH is an indicator 
equal to one if the client switches audit firms in the following year, zero otherwise. See the 
Appendix for all other variable definitions. Models are run with robust standard errors. *, **, *** 
indicate significance at p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01 levels, respectively (using two-tailed 
tests). 
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Table 13 
Robustness: The association between audit quality (discretionary accruals) and NPAC 
  
Coeff. t-value 
NPAC -0.002  (-0.58) 
CLIENTSIZE -0.005 *** (-11.78) 
LEVERAGE 0.024 *** (9.79) 
GCO 0.008 * (1.80) 
LOSS 0.015 *** (10.40) 
ROA -0.016 *** (-3.92) 
TENURE -0.004 *** (-3.62) 
INFLUENCE -0.006  (-0.54) 
INTANGIBLES -0.025 *** (-9.01) 
BUSY 0.003 *** (3.40) 
ACCEL_FILER 0.002  (1.62) 
BTM 0.000  (0.55) 
FIN 0.004 *** (2.82) 
FREEC 0.000  (1.42) 
ACQ 0.021 ** (1.97) 
ARINV 0.004  (1.02) 
ICMW 0.005 ** (2.24) 
MKT_VOL 0.000  (1.28) 
AUDITORSIZE 0.000 ** (2.09) 
AFEE_CLIENT -0.000  (-1.39) 
TAX_CLIENT -0.000  (-1.02) 
Constant      0.052 *** (6.95) 
Industry FE Yes   
Year FE   Yes   
Observations     17,848   
Adj. R-squared     0.177   
This table presents results from the estimation of Model (5). ACCRUALS is the absolute value of 
the residual from a modified performance adjusted discretionary accruals model as in Kothari et 
al. (2005). See the Appendix for all other variable definitions. Models are run with robust 
standard errors. *, **, *** indicate significance at p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01 levels, 
respectively (using two-tailed tests). 
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Table 14 
Robustness: The association between audit timeliness (audit opinion delay) and NPAC 
  
Coeff. t-value 
NPAC -1.916 ** (-2.57) 
CLIENTSIZE -3.074 *** (-33.70) 
LEVERAGE 1.669 *** (4.54) 
GCO 5.668 *** (8.73) 
LOSS 3.679 *** (15.23) 
ROA 3.276 *** (5.55) 
TENURE -1.587 *** (-8.46) 
INFLUENCE 8.956 *** (4.17) 
INTANGIBLES 4.289 *** (8.28) 
BUSY 0.230  (1.11) 
ACCEL_FILER -3.640 *** (-11.16) 
MTB -0.003 ** (-2.20) 
FIN -0.194 * (-1.81) 
FREEC -0.003 *** (-4.90) 
ACQ -3.987 * (-1.91) 
ARINV 3.199 *** (4.51) 
ICMW 7.083 *** (17.30) 
MKT_VOL 0.003 *** (3.32) 
AUDITORSIZE -0.000 *** (-5.35) 
AFEE_CLIENT 0.000 *** (8.31) 
TAX_CLIENT -0.000 *** (-5.22) 
Constant      89.642 *** (24.94) 
Industry FE Yes   
Year FE   Yes   
Observations     21,775   
Adj. R-squared     0.370   
This table presents results from the estimation of Model (6). DELAY is the number of days 
between the fiscal year end and the audit opinion date. See the Appendix for all other variable 
definitions. Models are run with robust standard errors. *, **, *** indicate significance at p < 
0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01 levels, respectively (using two-tailed tests). 
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Table 15 
Other Robustness: Alternative measure of NPAC  
 
 (1) (2) (3)  
MISSTATE LATE_FILE CLIENT_LNAFEE  
Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
NPAC_ALT 0.004  (0.39) -0.030  (-1.63) -0.600 *** (-19.48) 
CLIENTSIZE 0.001  (0.89) -0.003  (-1.46) 0.484 *** (141.39) 
LEVERAGE 0.012 ** (2.56) 0.050 *** (5.63) 0.235 *** (16.80) 
GCO -0.030 *** (-4.71) 0.190 *** (11.33) 0.059 *** (2.82) 
LOSS 0.005  (1.53) 0.056 *** (9.64) 0.119 *** (12.93) 
ROA -0.003  (-0.44) 0.033 ** (2.34) -0.385 *** (-18.88) 
TENURE -0.010 *** (-3.35) -0.029 *** (-6.79) -0.010  (-1.36) 
INFLUENCE -0.012  (-0.69) 0.102 * (1.69) 0.238 ** (2.56) 
INTANGIBLES 0.007  (0.94) 0.048 *** (3.87) 0.161 *** (7.74) 
BUSY -0.003  (-0.90) -0.012 *** (-2.59) 0.045 *** (5.82) 
ACCEL_FILER 0.007  (1.63) -0.002  (-0.27) 0.120 *** (10.69) 
MTB 0.000  (0.81) 0.000  (0.36) 0.000  (0.18) 
FIN -0.000  (-0.82) -0.002  (-1.00) 0.012 *** (5.36) 
FREEC -0.000 *** (-3.31) -0.000 *** (-6.54) -0.000 ** (-2.28) 
ACQ -0.026 *** (-5.05) 0.033  (0.67) 0.183 ** (2.28) 
ARINV -0.005  (-0.57) 0.064 *** (3.94) 0.542 *** (19.98) 
ICMW 0.037 *** (6.58) 0.225 *** (23.59) 0.064 *** (4.90) 
MKT_VOL 0.000  (0.36) -0.000 *** (-7.14) 0.000 *** (5.08) 
AUDITORSIZE 0.000 * (1.86) -0.000 *** (-3.14) 0.000 *** (22.22) 
AFEE_CLIENT 0.000  (0.38) 0.000 *** (7.18)    
TAX_CLIENT -0.000  (-0.47) -0.000 *** (-3.19) 0.000 *** (18.55) 
Constant      -0.017  (-1.05) 0.002  (0.01) 10.220 *** (30.62) 
Industry FE Yes   Yes   Yes   
Year FE   Yes   Yes 
 
 Yes   
Observations     21,777   21,777   21,777   
Adj. R-squared     0.027   0.172   0.829   
This table presents results from the estimation of Model (1) and (2). NPAC_ALT excludes private 
firms with public debt from the numerator of NPAC following the criteria set forth in 
Badertscher et al. (2014). See the text for full description of the criteria. See the Appendix for all 
other variable definitions. Models are run with robust standard errors. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01 levels, respectively (using two-tailed tests). 
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Table 16 
Other Robustness: Main tests with alternative clustering approach by company 
 
 (1) (2) (3)  
MISSTATE LATE_FILE CLIENT_LNAFEE  
Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
NPAC 0.001  (0.11) -0.037 ** (-1.96) -0.536 *** (-12.11) 
CLIENTSIZE 0.001  (0.66) -0.003  (-1.11) 0.484 *** (67.29) 
LEVERAGE 0.012 * (1.90) 0.050 *** (4.52) 0.236 *** (9.08) 
GCO -0.030 *** (-4.40) 0.190 *** (9.92) 0.058 ** (2.14) 
LOSS 0.005  (1.30) 0.056 *** (9.00) 0.120 *** (8.81) 
ROA -0.003  (-0.36) 0.033 ** (2.07) -0.385 *** (-11.77) 
TENURE -0.010 ** (-2.41) -0.029 *** (-5.59) -0.010  (-0.67) 
INFLUENCE -0.010  (-0.39) 0.111  (1.60) 0.232  (1.64) 
INTANGIBLES 0.007  (0.69) 0.048 *** (3.19) 0.161 *** (3.66) 
BUSY -0.003  (-0.64) -0.012 ** (-2.00) 0.045 ** (2.55) 
ACCEL_FILER 0.007  (1.24) -0.002  (-0.23) 0.121 *** (5.46) 
MTB 0.000  (0.78) 0.000  (0.36) 0.000  (0.16) 
FIN -0.000  (-0.75) -0.002  (-0.98) 0.012 *** (4.07) 
FREEC -0.000 ** (-2.42) -0.000 *** (-3.72) -0.000  (-1.07) 
ACQ -0.026 *** (-4.53) 0.033  (0.65) 0.183 ** (2.21) 
ARINV -0.005  (-0.41) 0.065 *** (3.17) 0.541 *** (9.77) 
ICMW 0.037 *** (6.10) 0.225 *** (21.24) 0.063 *** (3.80) 
MKT_VOL 0.000  (0.35) -0.000 *** (-6.79) 0.000 *** (4.68) 
AUDITORSIZE 0.000  (1.27) -0.000 *** (-2.80) 0.000 *** (9.78) 
AFEE_CLIENT 0.000  (0.34) 0.000 *** (4.11)    
TAX_CLIENT -0.000  (-0.45) -0.000 *** (-2.69) 0.000 *** (10.96) 
Constant      -0.015  (-0.87) 0.004  (0.03) 10.146 *** (30.17) 
Industry FE Yes   Yes   Yes   
Year FE Yes   Yes   Yes   
Company FE   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Observations     21,777   21,777   21,777   
Adj. R-squared     0.027   0.172   0.829   
This table presents results from the estimation of Model (1) and (2). See the Appendix for all 
other variable definitions. Models are run with robust standard errors. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01 levels, respectively (using two-tailed tests). 
 
